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 iii 
Introduction 
  
By any measure, Frantz Fanon died before his time, at the age of 36. Arguably, 
Fanon also lived before his time. Born in 1925 in Martinique – at the time a French 
colonial possession – Fanon moved to France in the late 1940s to study medicine, 
attending Merleau-Ponty’s lectures and reading widely in philosophy, anthropology, and 
literature in his spare time. From the early 1950s until his death in 1961, Fanon would 
write some of the twentieth-century’s most nuanced and influential analyses of modern 
racism and colonialism, all the while practicing psychiatry at public hospitals in France 
and across North Africa. Tracing the contours of Fanon’s intellectual biography, this 
thesis explores the ways in which Fanon’s medical training and practice informed his 
groundbreaking insights into the political plight of the colonized.  
Elements of Fanon’s interdisciplinary methodology inspired the rise of academic 
disciplines like Cultural Studies and Postcolonial Studies in the late twentieth century. 
Over the course of his brief career as a public intellectual, Fanon would attend with care 
to the relationship between culture and politics. In Black Skin, White Masks he argued 
that European comic books contributed to feelings of racial inferiority among the black 
children who read them in the Antilles. In A Dying Colonialism he chronicled the vital 
role that radio played in the Algerian revolution. And in The Wretched of the Earth, he 
criticized nationalist intellectuals for perpetuating archaic stereotypes about North 
African culture. In the late twentieth century, scholars such as Edward Said, Homi 
Bhabha, and Paul Gilroy would find the conceptual pillars of postcolonial studies – 
multiculturalism, transnationality, hybridity – sketched out in Fanon’s seminal writings. 
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At the time, however, these scholars had relatively little to say about Fanon’s 
transgressive integration of cultural concerns into medical theory, or about the extent to 
which Fanon’s vocation as a physician gave shape to the concepts and arguments that 
later postcolonial historians and literary critics would find so useful.  
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, scholars such as Alice Cherki and 
Nigel Gibson published intellectual biographies of Fanon, which highlighted the 
importance of his psychiatric and psychoanalytic practice in the evolution of his 
philosophical and political thought. A practicing psychoanalyst who worked with Fanon 
in the late 1950s, Cherki pays particular attention to Fanon’s struggles and triumphs in 
the medical field and their refractions in his most influential publications. Gibson pursues 
a more philosophical line of argument, seeking to understand how Fanon’s 
psychoanalytic and psychiatric practice informed his understanding of the dialectics of 
history and revolution. Cherki’s biographical intentions are more pronounced than 
Gibson’s. Whereas Cherki’s book is a biography that occasionally participates in the 
exegesis and critique of Fanon’s published works, Gibson’s is a body of textual 
commentary and interpretation grounded in occasional references to important 
biographical facts. This thesis seeks to combine Cherki’s keen interest in Fanon’s 
development as a psychoanalyst and psychiatrist with Gibson’s sharp, interpretive 
readings of Black Skin, White Masks, A Dying Colonialism, The Wretched of the Earth, as 
well as Fanon’s short but significant essays pertaining to politics and psychiatry.   
The following chapters present a chronological study of Fanon’s major works in 
relation to his evolving psychoanalytic and psychiatric practice, foregrounding his 
lifelong interests in philosophy, anthropology, literature, and other humanistic modes of 
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inquiry. Chapter One argues that, in Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon reads G. W. F. 
Hegel’s philosophy of history in light of Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic study of 
Civilization and Its Discontents, in the process critiquing both thinkers’ agonistic vision 
of historical change. Ultimately, Fanon re-imagines psychoanalytic practice as an 
affirmative, non-violent means of fostering social and political change. Chapter Two 
maps Fanon’s lifelong efforts to reform the state medical institution in the direction of 
contributing to the psychological and political liberation of the colonized. Unlike Michel 
Foucault, who would never abandon his skepticism vis-à-vis the merits of institutional 
medicine, Fanon seeks to transform the practice of medicine in the French colonies, 
seeing this project as a key tactic of anticolonial resistance. Chapter Three argues that 
Fanon’s provocative publication of a series of psychiatric case studies at the end of The 
Wretched of the Earth demonstrates not only his tireless commitment to caring for the 
mentally ill but also his insistence that certain kinds of medical knowledge should inform 
the political strategies of revolution and the management of its aftermath. It is in part due 
to the psychiatric testimony that Fanon chooses to include at the end of his final book that 
Homi Bhabha and Nigel Gibson understand Fanon as among the first intellectuals to 
conceptualize the nation as an inherently multicultural and variegated polity. Fanon saw 
medicine, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis not only as tools of colonial control, but also as 
potential weapons in the struggle against racism and colonialism.  
Fanon’s suspicions about the ostensibly objective and disinterested perspective of 
the medical sciences as well as his prescient desire to reach across entrenched 
disciplinary boundaries should inform twenty-first century modes of knowledge 
production at the university. The ascendency of the medical humanities, inspired largely 
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by the work of Michel Foucault and Félix Guattari, is a promising sign. Yet harried 
judgments about Fanon’s so-called sermons on violence in The Wretched of the Earth – 
which obscure the fact that he cared for those traumatized by revolutionary bloodshed 
until he succumbed to leukemia in 1961 – perhaps account for Frantz Fanon’s low profile 
in the medical humanities, despite the fact that he anticipates many of its intellectual 
concerns. The research that I have conducted in the course of writing this thesis has led 
me to believe that Fanon was not only a forward-thinking cultural critic and postcolonial 
visionary, but also a medical practitioner who believed that his role as a physician was to 
create a world healthier and more equitable than the one he was born into. 
  
 vii 
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 1 
Love, Affirmation, and Psychoanalysis as Political Action 
 
 As a fourth-year student in psychiatric medicine at the University of Lyon, Frantz 
Fanon “caused quite a scandal”1 when he turned in an early manuscript of Black Skin, 
White Masks as his doctoral thesis. Fanon’s advisor was Professor Jean Dechaume, a 
psychosurgeon who, when diagnosing patients, “attributed all psychiatric conditions to 
organic origins.”2 Drawing on psychoanalysis, philosophy, and literature, Fanon’s 
“sociodiagnostic” methodology in Black Skin displeased Dechaume, who rejected the 
thesis outright (BS xv). Intent on graduating, Fanon “decided to submit an altogether 
different and indisputably academic project on Friedrich’s ataxia,” a hereditary 
neurological disorder.3 This approach satisfied Dechaume, and Fanon received his degree 
as a doctor of medicine in 1951. Fortunately, however, Fanon did not burn his original 
manuscript, instead sending it to Francis Jeanson, editor at the Editions du Seuil. Jeanson 
published Fanon’s text as Peau noire, masques blancs in 1952, and would later publish 
Jacques Lacan’s Seminars, among other key works in psychoanalysis and philosophy. 
Fanon’s groundbreaking study of racism is indebted to psychoanalysis in many 
ways. Fanon borrows his notion of inferiority from Alfred Adler, draws on Carl Jung’s 
concept of the “collective unconscious” in order to explain the relationship between 
European culture and racial discrimination, and, in a two-page footnote, employs Lacan’s 
“mirror stage” to illustrate why the Antillean imagines himself as white. Ronald A. T. 
Judy argues that, as a whole, Black Skin “bears a striking resemblance to Freud’s … 
Civilization and Its Discontents. That is to say it interprets the sociogenesis of 
                                                
1 Alice Cherki, Frantz Fanon: A Portrait, trans. Nadia Benabid (Cornell University Press, 2006), 18. 
2 Ibid., 17. 
3 Ibid., 18. 
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psychopathology on the basis of ontogenetic analysis.”4 Most often, autobiography 
mediates Fanon’s logical progression from the ontogenetic to the sociogenetic: Fanon 
frequently draws conclusions about “the colonized” on the basis of his own experiences 
growing up in the French Antilles. Judy’s argument also explains the appearance of brief 
case studies in Black Skin. For example, Fanon appends the case history of 
“Mademoiselle B” to the end of “The Black Man and Psychopathology.” Fanon’s patient 
exhibits symptoms of a nervous disorder; using waking-dream therapy, Fanon determines 
that she is terrified of “the black man,” whom she imagines as a “half-naked” cannibal 
intent on devouring Europeans (BS 180, 181). That this myth has penetrated into the 
unconscious constitutes, for Fanon, proof that “European culture has an imago of the 
black man that makes him responsible for every possible conflictual situation” (BS 146).5 
Like Freud, Fanon applies the insights gained in clinical practice to the diagnosis of 
larger cultural phenomena. 
In Freud and his followers, Fanon found a model for a more integrated intellectual 
approach to clinical theory and practice, one that could be traced back to the physician-
humanists of the Renaissance. Like Freud, Fanon privileged evidence and modes of 
argument drawn from various academic disciplines, a tendency that that doctors like Jean 
Dechaume increasingly barred from the clinic. The arguments in Civilization and Black 
Skin often rely on literary, anthropological, and philosophical evidence. In Civilization, 
Freud elaborates his concept of the death-drive – on which his broader argument hinges 
                                                
4 Ronald A. T. Judy, “Fanon’s Body of Black Experience,” in Fanon: A Critical Reader, ed. Lewis R. 
Gordon, T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting, and Renée T. White (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 
1996), 73. 
5 “[N]ous disons que la culture européenne possède une imago du nègre responsable de tous les 
conflits qui peuvent naître” (PN 136).   
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almost entirely – by quoting at length from Goethe’s Faust.6 Other literary allusions 
include Voltaire’s Candide, whose allegorical ending Freud cites as an archetypical 
example of sublimation,7 and Mark Twain’s The First Melon I Ever Stole, which serves 
to illustrate the role the super-ego plays in the exercise of conscience.8 Totemic cultures, 
which Freud first explored in Totem and Taboo, serve as the starting point for his analysis 
of the roles that love and violence play in the development of human civilization. 
Cherki’s biography of Fanon reveals that he understood the study of the humanities and 
social sciences as a fundamental component of his medical education. Fanon frequently 
read poetry, and “tried his hand at dramatic writing,” resulting in “a number of unfinished 
works as well as two completed plays.”9 In Black Skin, Fanon turns to the novels of 
Mayotte Capécia and René Maran, as well as various comic books and animated films, in 
order to illustrate the inferiority and abandonment complexes that haunt the French 
Antilles. Fanon would also read “Lévi-Strauss, Mauss, Heidegger, Hegel, as well as 
Lenin and the young Marx” in between shifts as an intern at Lyon’s Grange-Blanche 
Hospital.10 In Black Skin, Fanon mobilizes his anthropological knowledge in order to 
expose the flaws in Octave Mannoni’s ethnopsychiatric study of the Malagasy’s “so-
called dependency complex [prétendu complexe de dépendance]” (BS 64; PN 67). 
Whereas Mannoni maintains that the Malagasy’s “dependency complex” derives from 
essential flaws in his personality, Fanon argues that the Malagasy’s behavior is a 
consequence of the social and economic conditions violently imposed by European 
                                                
6 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton 
and Company, 1961), 80. 
7 Ibid., 24. 
8 Ibid., 86. 
9 Cherki, Frantz Fanon: A Portrait, 16. 
10 Ibid. 
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colonialists. Moreover, the philosophical method of Jean-Paul Sartre – especially his 
phenomenology of anti-Semitism – serves as a heuristic in Fanon’s diagnosis of the 
etiology of the alienation of the black man. And in the last chapter of Black Skin, “The 
Black Man and Recognition,” Fanon turns to G. W. F. Hegel’s philosophy of history in 
his analysis of the putatively pervasive nature of neurosis on the part of “the black man.”  
Fanon questions the reading of Hegel that was then dominant in French 
intellectual circles, one that relied on a universalizing model of human subjectivity to 
explain historical rupture. His re-reading of Hegel grew out of and fed into Fanon’s 
critical engagement with Freudian ideas about the relation between history and human 
subjectivity. For Fanon, Hegel’s master-slave dialectic does not offer a guide to 
contesting modern colonialism because of the historically unprecedented ways in which 
colonial subjects participate in their own exploitation. Educated into a grotesque 
misrecognition, the colonial subject becomes his own other in a master-slave battle 
waged against the self. Fanon elaborates this analysis of Hegel through his critique of 
Freud’s explanations of the socially binding nature of certain kinds of aggression. 
Convinced that neither Hegel’s ontology of negation nor Freud’s discussion of the 
strategic sublimation of aggression would lead to political liberation, Fanon invests 
another key term in Freud’s Civilization – love – with revolutionary potential. Ultimately, 
Fanon charges psychoanalytic practice with the responsibility of mobilizing a politics of 
affirmation against the racist ideology and false consciousness propagated by twentieth-
century colonialism.  
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Hegel and History 
As a student in Lyon between 1945 and 1951, Fanon encountered a universalizing 
interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of history produced, in large part, by two Marxist 
scholars: Jean Hyppolite and Alexandre Kojève. The clearest evidence that this 
perspective influenced Fanon is his footnote citing Hyppolite’s translation of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit in Black Skin, White Masks (PN 176). Fanon does not refer 
directly to Kojève; however, he returns multiple times to the work of J.P. Sartre and 
Jacques Lacan, who both attended Kojève’s influential seminar on Hegel in the 1930s. 
The imprint of Kojève’s Hegel is particularly visible in concepts like Lacan’s mirror 
stage, which Fanon engages at length. Furthermore, Fanon’s capitalized and italicized 
reference to “Désir” in his commentary on the Phenomenology recalls Kojève’s 
Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, which breaks French grammatical norms by 
systematically capitalizing this noun (PN 176). Whereas Kojève envisions Desire as the 
universal impetus for historical progress, Fanon critiques Kojève’s theory on the basis of 
the particular socio-historical contingencies of colonialism.  
Kojève’s conception of history begins with the notion that Desire is the source of 
all human action, a concept that he defines as the negation of nature:  
“Born of Desire, action tends to satisfy it, and can only do so by the ‘negation,’ 
the destruction, or at least the transformation, of the desired object. … Thus, all 
action is ‘negating.’”11  
When Desire encounters a “natural object,” like an animal, its transformation into food 
and the subsequent consumption thereof constitute the negating action. However, when 
                                                
11 Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1980), 4. 
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Desire encounters a human being, that is, another Desire, it must negate or at least 
transform that Desire. The human being, therefore, risks its life upon encountering 
another – thereby negating its survival instinct – in order to demand recognition of its 
Desire. The other must either recognize the first or risk its own life in order to demand 
recognition. But the other cannot risk its own life, for if he perishes “with him disappears 
that other Desire toward which Desire must be directed in order to be a human Desire.”12 
So both must live. For Kojève, this compromise conditions a particular social situation in 
which “the one must fear the other, must give in to the other, must refuse to risk his life 
for the satisfaction of his desire for ‘recognition.’ He must give up his desire and satisfy 
the desire of the other: he must ‘recognize’ the other without being ‘recognized’ by 
him.”13 Kojève calls the one who relinquishes his Desire the “Slave,” and the one whose 
Desire is recognized, the “Master.”  
Kojève insists that the dialectic between an abstract Master and his abstract Slave 
provides a model for the interpretation of human history.14 Following Marx, moreover, 
Kojève privileges the historical role of the Slave: “If idle Mastery is an impasse, 
laborious Slavery, in contrast, is the source of all human, social, historical progress. 
History is the history of the working Slave.”15 This is because, Kojève argues, only the 
Slave has the Desire to restart the fight for recognition by risking his life: “If the Master 
has no desire to “overcome … himself as master (since this would mean, for him, to 
become a Slave), the slave has every reason to cease to be a slave.”16 In other words, only 
the Slave desires to take the action of negating himself as a Slave. Furthermore, Kojève 
                                                
12 Ibid., 8. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 10. 
15 Ibid., 20. 
16 Ibid., 21. 
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argues, the Slave is in a privileged position to effect historical change because of his 
unique capacity for work, that is, the active negation or transformation of Nature. The 
Slave, therefore, has both the Desire and the ability to make historical change: “If the fear 
of death is the sine qua non of historical progress, it is solely the Slave’s work that 
realizes and perfects it.”17 In Europe’s industrial twentieth-century, Kojève’s optimistic 
view on the relationship between labor and historical progress proved highly influential. 
Many prominent and politically minded intellectuals – often Kojève’s own students – 
were happy to imagine the relationship between the bourgeoisie and proletariat as one 
between Master and Slave. 
Fanon critiques these readings of Hegel on the grounds of their ahistoricity, thus 
anticipating twenty-first century scholars who insist that Hegel was aware of the 
historical contingency of his own argument and terminology. In his 2004 essay, “What 
Hegel’s Master/Slave Dialectic Really Means,” Andrew Cole argues that Hegel’s view of 
history was deeply influenced by the fact that he was living in and writing about a society 
that was still predominantly feudal.18 Cole argues that Hegel's historical judgments about 
feudalism are embedded in his language. In the Phenomenology, for example, Hegel 
opposes der Herr, meaning “lord,” to der Knecht, meaning “bondsman” or “serf.”19 
Hyppolite’s influential translation, Cole argues, disregards the consistent and historically 
precise way in which Hegel employed his terms: when Hegel mentions the Sklave 
(“slave”), for example, in The Philosophy of Right, it is in specific reference to the laws 
                                                
17 Ibid., 23. 
18 Andrew Cole, “What Hegel’s Master/Slave Dialectic Really Means,” Journal of Medieval and 
Early Modern Studies 34, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 577–578. 
19 Ibid., 578–579. 
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of slave-holding Rome.20 Merging the Roman Sklave and the Feudal Knecht into an 
abstract esclave subservient to an abstract maître, Kojève and Hyppolite eliminate the 
attention to historical and cultural difference that Cole argues is central to Hegel’s 
philosophy. Susan Buck-Morss emphasizes a different aspect of nineteenth-century 
politics and culture in her Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History (2009), arguing that Hegel 
not only read about the slave revolt that became the Haitian Revolution in newspapers 
like Minerva but that he also: “elaborated his dialectic of lordship and bondage 
deliberately within this contemporary context.”21 Ultimately, Buck-Morss’ historicist 
analysis displays a theoretical affinity with Kojève’s abstract idealism by emphasizing 
the role that “recognition” played in the Haitian slaves’ success: 
The actual and successful revolution of Caribbean slaves against their masters is 
the moment when the dialectical logic of recognition becomes visible as the 
thematic of world history, the story of the universal realization of freedom.22 
In conclusion, Buck-Morss demonstrates her belief that Hegel’s dialectic can be applied 
to other historical contexts by urging fellow and future scholars to “juxtapose” what she 
reads as Hegel’s analysis of the Haitian Revolution with other moments in the history of 
decolonization.23   
If Fanon anticipates twenty-first-century scholars’ interest in historicizing 
readings of Hegel, he would have disagreed with some of their conclusions. For example, 
Fanon’s critique of the French Hegelians diverges from Buck-Morss’ starkly in that 
Fanon differentiates the blacks who successfully overthrew their masters in the Haitian 
                                                
20 Ibid., 581. 
21 Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 2009), 50. 
22 Ibid., 59–60. 
23 Ibid., 75. 
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Revolution from the blacks living under colonial rule in the mid-twentieth century. 
Unlike the Haitian slave, the modern colonial subject did not have to risk his life in a 
fight to the death. Aside from Haiti, in France and the French colonies, the black man 
was “set free by the master [a été libéré par le maître]” (BS 194; PN 178). Yet, this did 
not constitute “recognition [reconnaissance]” because, according to Fanon, “the black 
man was acted upon [le Noir a été agi]” (BS 194; PN 178). There was no revolution; 
nothing turned over; there was no dialectical reversal. “The black man did not become a 
master” (BS 194). Instead, there was a paradigm shift in social relations: “When there are 
no more slaves, there are no masters” (BS 194).24 Fanon argues that colonial societies are 
distinct from all other Hegelian models, whether elaborated in feudal, Haitian, or abstract 
historical contexts.  
In Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon turns to Freudian psychoanalysis in order to 
develop a concept of politics and history distinct from the French Hegelians’. Drawing on 
Freud's discussion of “love” in Civilization and Its Discontents, Fanon juxtaposes the 
Freudian concept to Kojève’s “Desire,” in the process defining revolutionary action in 
terms of affirmation rather than negation. At the same time, Fanon rejects Freud’s 
argument in Civilization that engaging in nationalist or ethnic rivalries is a politically 
valuable means of sublimating the aggressive impulse. In fact, Black Skin questions 
Freud’s nonchalance towards racial scapegoating, as well as his insistence that 
psychoanalysis cannot lead to lasting political and societal change in the world.  
 
                                                
24 “Le nègre n’est pas devenu un maître. Quand il n’y a plus d'esclaves, il n’y a pas de maîtres” (PN 
178).  
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Freud and the Sublimation of Aggression  
 In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud begins his analysis of human society 
with the role that the pleasure principle plays in determining the family unit: “One may 
suppose that the founding of families was connected with the fact that a moment came 
when the need for genital satisfaction no longer made its appearance like a guest who 
drops in suddenly, and, after his departure, is heard of no more for a long time, but 
instead took up its quarters as a permanent lodger.”25 This “primitive family” does not 
constitute civilization for Freud because the will of one individual, the father, overpowers 
all others. Although the impulse for sexual satisfaction may have first brought people 
together, it is the degree to which “the members of the community restrict themselves in 
their possibilities of satisfaction” that keeps them together.26 The first sexual restriction, 
Freud argues, is “the prohibition against an incestuous choice of object.”27 Later, in 
“Western European civilization, … the choice of an object is restricted to the opposite 
sex, and most-extra genital satisfactions are forbidden as perversions.”28 The impulse for 
sexual satisfaction is also sublimated in the form of “aim-inhibited love,” which aids the 
growth of civilization in the form of “positive feelings between parents and children, and 
between the brothers and sisters of a family” as well as friendships.29 Despite the 
sublimating possibility of friendship, Freud argues that the repressive demands that 
civilization places on sexuality remain a source of hostility between human beings. 
Although love may constitute the foundation of civilization, it also has the possibility to 
destroy civilization if not properly regulated.  
                                                
25 Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 53. 
26 Ibid., 49. 
27 Ibid., 59. 
28 Ibid., 60. 
29 Ibid., 58. 
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Whereas Freud emphasizes the coherence and importance of the family unit, Fanon 
argues that, under modern colonialism, the Oedipal complex is taken out of the familial 
sphere and institutionalized through the legal apparatus and through the indoctrination of 
children into racist ideology. As a result, colonial law literalizes the threat of castration 
while colonial subjects identify themselves with the very agency that issues this threat 
and holds them in contempt. “Historically,” Fanon writes, “the Negro found guilty of 
sleeping with a white woman was castrated” (BS 53).30 Even in Fanon’s time, “As 
regards the black man everything in fact takes place at the genital level”; Europe fears 
that “if we’re not careful they’ll inundate us with little mulattoes” (BS 135).31 So Jean 
Veneuse, the main character of René Maran’s novel, Un homme pareil aux autres, cannot 
marry Andrée Marielle, the white woman he loves. For, she is told, “associating with 
anybody of that race is disgracing yourself” (BS 47).32 And, according to her 
autobiographical novel, Mayotte Capécia feels permanently inferior to André, the white 
man of her dreams, since the “colored woman is never quite respectable in the eyes of a 
white man” (BS 25).33 In pursuit of love, Veneuse and Capécia “[strive] for lactification” 
(BS 29).34 They try, in vain, to eliminate the black within. In order to direct attention 
away from the color of their skin, Capécia brags about her “white grandmother [une 
grand-mère blanche]” and “white blood [du sang blanc]” and Veneuse asserts his 
mastery of European culture and French-issued birth certificate (BS 28, 29; PN 37). In 
                                                
30 “Historiquement, nous savons que le nègre coupable d’avoir couché avec une Blanche est castré” 
(PN 58).  
31 “Vis-à-vis du nègre, en effet, tout se passe sur le plan génital. … Ils ont tellement d’enfants qu’ils 
ne les comptent plus. Méfions-nous, car il nous inonderaient de petits métis” (PN 127-128).  
32 “C’est déchoir que frayer avec quelque individu que ce soit de cette race” (PN 53). 
33 “Seulement une femme de couleur n’est jamais tout à fait respectable aux yeux d’un Blanc” (PN 
34). 
34 “C’est vers la lactification que tend Mayotte” (PN 38).   
 12 
doing so, however, both demonize blackness, invariably causing a “devaluation of self [la 
non-valorisation de soi-même]” (BS 54; PN 59). “Authentic love,” Fanon argues, 
“remains impossible as long as this feeling of inferiority … has not been purged” (BS 
25).35 As Veneuse and Capécia demonstrate, however, purging the colonized’s feeling of 
inferiority is in fact the opposite of purging the colonized of his blackness. Political 
equality is not a matter of the black man “[elevating] himself to the white man’s level 
[s’élever jusqu’au Blanc]” Fanon writes (BS 63; PN 66). “We shall see that another 
solution is possible. It implies restructuring the world” (BS 63).36 
 For Fanon, Capécia and Maran’s novels illustrate how, under colonialism, the 
aggressive impulse is channeled inward – and internalized by the colonized subject – 
rather than outward toward the colonizer in the way that Hegelian accounts of historical 
struggle would suggest. Moreover, Black Skin, White Masks offers a new perspective on 
Freud’s argument that certain strategic externalizations of the aggressive impulse play a 
key role in social cohesion. The essence of Freud’s famous hypothesis is that: “[I]t is 
always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so long as there 
are other people left over to receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness.”37 
Historically, what Freud calls “the narcissism of minor differences” would manifest in 
the form of fraternal “feuds” between the “Spaniards and Portuguese, … North Germans 
and South Germans, the English and Scotch.” Even in light of “all the massacres of the 
Jews in the Middle Ages,” Freud goes on to describe this scapegoating mechanism as “a 
                                                
35 “Il s’agit, pour nous, dans ce chapitre consacré aux rapports de la femme de couleur et de 
l’Européen, de déterminer dans quelle mesure l’amour authentique demeurera impossible tant que ne 
seront pas expulsés ce sentiment d’infériorité ou cette exaltation adlérienne” (PN 33).  
36 “Nous verrons qu’une autre solution est possible. Elle implique une restructuration du monde” (PN 
66).  
37 Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 72. 
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convenient and relatively harmless satisfaction of the inclination to aggression.”38 As 
Freud himself observed, aggression binds groups only insofar as any two members of any 
two “feuding” groups consent to a reciprocal sublimation of aggression. Freud’s critiques 
of Christianity’s injunction to “love they neighbor as thyself,” of fascism and Nazism, 
and of Communism’s utopian desires all hinge on the question of what would happen to 
those movements if the infidels, undesirables, and bourgeoisie were ever successfully 
“wiped out.”39 Since “neither Freud nor Adler nor even the cosmic Jung took the black 
man into consideration in the course of his research,” Fanon takes it upon himself to 
distinguish colonialism from “the narcissism of minor differences” and associate it with 
other destructive ideologies by exposing the forces that render the black man without 
“ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man” (BS 90).40 
 Black Skin reveals the ways in which the colonial education system and culture 
industries designate the black man as the target of the hostile and aggressive impulses 
that “come to light” when the death-drive “is diverted towards the external world.”41 As 
the novels of Mayotte Capécia and René Maran demonstrate, this problem is double 
because it is not only the Frenchman but also the colonized subject who channels his 
aggression towards the black man. Through “education” the colonized subject learns to 
aggress, unconsciously, against his very self. In “the Tarzan stories, the tales of young 
explorers, the adventures of Mickey Mouse,” Fanon writes, “the Wolf, the Devil, the 
Wicked Genie, Evil, and the savage are always represented by Blacks or Indians” (BS 
124-125). “Since one always identifies with the good guys,” Fanon continues, “the little 
                                                
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 73. 
40 “Le Noir n’a pas de résistance ontologique aux yeux du Blanc” (PN 89). 
41 Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 78. 
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black child, just like the little white child, becomes an explorer, an adventurer, and a 
missionary ‘who is in danger of being eaten by the wicked Negroes’” (BS 125).42 As for 
education:  
In the Antilles, the black schoolboy who is constantly asked to recite ‘our 
ancestors the Gauls’ identifies himself with the explorer, the civilizing colonizer, 
the white man who brings truth to the savages, a lily-white truth. The 
identification process means that the black child subjectively adopts a white 
man’s attitude. He invests the hero, who is white, with all his aggressiveness—
which at this age closely resembles self-sacrifice: a self-sacrifice loaded with 
sadism. … As a schoolboy I spent hours discussing the supposed customs of the 
Senegalese savages. In our discussions, there was a lack of awareness that was 
paradoxical to say the least. The fact is that the Antillean does not see himself as 
Negro: he seems himself as Antillean. The Negro lives in Africa. Subjectively and 
intellectually the Antillean behaves like a white man. But in fact he is a black 
man. (BS 126)43 
Eventually, these images, stories, and histories crystallize in the form of what Fanon 
identifies as Europe’s culturally-constructed “collective unconscious” of racist myth, 
                                                
42 “Les histoires de Tarzan, d’explorateurs de douze ans, de Mickey, et tous les journaux illustrés, 
tendent à un véritable défoulement d’agressivité collective. … Et le Loup, le Diable, le Mauvais 
Génie, le Mal, le Sauvage sont toujours représentés par un nègre ou un Indien, et comme il y a 
toujours identification avec le vainqueur, le petit nègre se fait explorateur, aventurier, missionnaire 
‘qui risque d’être mangé par les méchants nègres’ aussi facilement que le petit Blanc” (PN 119).  
43“Aux Antilles, le jeune Noir, qui à l’école ne cesse de répéter ‘nos pères, les Gaulois,’ s’identifie à 
l’explorateur, au civilisateur, au Blanc qui apporte la vérité aux sauvages, une vérité toute blanche. Il y 
a identification, c’est-à-dire que le jeune Noir adopte subjectivement une attitude de Blanc. Il charge 
le héros, qui est Blanc, de toute son agressivité, — laquelle, à cet âge, s’apparente étroitement à 
l’oblativité : une oblativité chargée de sadisme. ... Etant écolier, nous avons pu discuter pendant des 
heures entières sur les prétendues coutumes des sauvages sénégalais. Il y avait dans nos propos une 
inconscience pour le moins paradoxale. Mais c’est que l’Antillais ne se pense pas Noir ; il se pense 
Antillais. Le nègre vit en Afrique. Subjectivement, intellectuellement, l’Antillais se comporte comme 
un Blanc. Or, c’est un nègre” (PN 120).  
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symbolism, and stereotype (BS 165-166). In colonialism, the image of the black man 
represents “bad instincts [des mauvais instincts]” “sin [le péché]” “the dark side of the 
personality [l’archétype des valeurs inferieurs]” and “the essence of evil [le principe du 
mal]” for both the white man and the black man – that is, himself (BS 164, 166, 167; PN 
151, 153). Thus, Fanon laments, “it is normal for the Antillean to be a negrophobe [il est 
normal que l’Antillais soit négrophobe]” (BS 168; PN 154).  
 
Psychoanalysis as Political Action 
At the end of Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud argues that psychoanalysis 
can offer no decisive solution to the perennial human problems of violence, inequality, 
and discrimination. Yet, in Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon understands psychoanalysis 
as a crucial part of the politics of decolonization.44 Reading Freud’s Civilization through 
the existentialist thought of Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, Fanon suggests that human 
beings have some choice over the impulses that they submit to:  
Man moves toward the world and his kind. A movement of aggressiveness, 
engendering servitude or conquest; a movement of love, a gift of self, the final 
stage of what is commonly called ethical orientation. Every consciousness seems 
to be able to express these two elements simultaneously or alternatively. (BS 24, 
translation modified)45  
Fanon argues that the psychoanalyst has not only the intellectual ability to distinguish the 
loving impulse from the aggressive impulse but also the political responsibility to 
                                                
44 Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 110–112. 
45 “L’homme est mouvement vers le monde et vers son semblable. Mouvement d’agressivité, qui 
engendre l’asservissement ou la conquête; mouvement d’amour, don de soi, terme final de ce qu’il est 
convenu d’appeler l’orientation éthique. Toute conscience semble pouvoir manifester, simultanément 
ou alternativement, ces deux composantes” (PN 33). 
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encourage his patient to move toward love rather than aggression. For Fanon, 
psychoanalytic therapy should lead the patient to realize the destructive ways in which 
colonial society conditions him to direct his aggression toward himself. Instead of 
guiding his patient to direct his aggression towards the colonist – in hopes of enabling the 
“narcissism of minor differences” – Fanon offers a less agonistic vision of revolutionary 
politics:   
We said in our introduction that man was an affirmation. We shall never stop 
repeating it. Yes to life. Yes to love. Yes to generosity. But man is also a 
negation. No to man’s contempt. No to the indignity of man. To the massacre of 
what is most human in man: freedom. (BS 197)46  
Achieving the psychological and political disalienation of the black man requires saying 
“no” to the theory of history and politics proposed by the French Hegelians and, in many 
ways, the one offered by Freud in Civilization and Its Discontents. For Fanon, 
psychoanalysis provides a means of transforming a colonial society of dehumanizing 
negation and aggression and into a post-colonial society of mutual affirmation and love: 
My patient is suffering from an inferiority complex. … If he is overcome to such 
a degree by a desire to be white, it’s because he lives in a society that … 
proclaims the superiority of one race over another. … What emerges then is a 
need for combined action on the individual and the group. As a psychoanalyst I 
must help my patient to ‘consciousnessize’ his unconscious, to no longer be 
                                                
46 “Nous avons dit dans notre introduction que l’homme était un oui. Nous ne cesserons de le répéter. 
Oui à la vie. Oui à l’amour. Oui à la générosité. Mais l’homme est aussi un non. Non au mépris de 
l’homme. Non à l’indignité de l’homme. A l’exploitation de l’homme. Au meurtre de ce qu’il y a de 
plus humain dans l’homme : la liberté” (PN 180). 
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temped by a hallucinatory lactification, but also to act along the lines of a change 
in the social structure. (BS 80)47 
Psychoanalysis guides man towards action only by “maintaining by in his circularity the 
respect of the fundamental values that make the world human [en maintenant dans sa 
circularité le respect des valeurs fondamentales qui font un monde humain]” (BS 197; 
PN 180). For Fanon, the “fateful question” is not, as Freud argues, one of controlling 
aggression but one of fostering love.48  
These largely neglected humanist strains of Black Skin, White Masks contradict 
what Lou Turner calls the “hegemonic” understanding of Fanon in the contemporary 
academy as an “apostle of violence.”49 Following Sartre, whose preface to The Wretched 
of the Earth glorifies the role violence plays in Fanon’s final book, many scholars have 
characterized Fanon as a rabble-rouser and militant firebrand. In order to contextualize 
and ultimately rethink the place of violence in The Wretched, Chapter Three will 
highlight the attention that Fanon devotes in his writing as well as his medical practice to 
the negative psychological and emotional consequences of decolonial warfare. As early 
as Black Skin, however, which Fanon finished before moving to Algeria in 1953, the 
passion with which he returns to the concepts of “love” and “affirmation,” even in the 
face of the humiliating aggression and negation of colonial racism, suggests at least a 
                                                
47 “Mon patient souffre d’un complexe d’infériorité. … S’il se trouve à ce point submerge par le désir 
d’être blanc, c’est qu’il vit dans une société qui … affirme la supériorité d’une race. … Ce qui 
apparaît alors, c’est la nécessité d’une action couplée sur l’individu et sur le group. En tant que 
psychanalyste, je dois aider mon client à conscienciser son inconscient, à ne plus tenter une 
lactification hallucinatoire, mais bien à agir dans le sens d’un changement des structures sociales” (PN 
80).    
48 Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 111. 
49 Lou Turner, “Fanon and the Biopolitics of Torture: Contextualizing Psychological Practices as 
Tools of War,” in Living Fanon: Global Perspectives, by Nigel Gibson, Contemporary Black History 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 124. 
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keen interest in non-violent methods of political action, one that grows out of his 
understanding of the ethical mandate of the psychoanalyst and the physician. 
Chapter Two chronicles Fanon’s efforts to reform other, non-psychoanalytic 
forms of medicine and psychiatry that he realized were systematically deployed in the 
service of colonialism. Fanon's mid-career writing poses the question of how medical 
knowledge and practice might contribute to the politics of decolonization. As he did in 
Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon will continue to adapt elements of Freud’s thought to 
reflect on the lived experience of the black man under colonialism, and, increasingly, on 
the complicity of physicians in France’s violent exploitation of its colonial possessions. 
Fanon’s later works aim to strip the medical institution and medical practice of the racist 
prejudices that prevent the colonized from realizing the public health and quality of life 
benefits that Fanon believes European medicine can offer. 
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The Medical Practice of Frantz Fanon: From Discipline to Liberation 
 
In a 2007 essay, Richard C. Keller suggests a connection between Frantz Fanon’s 
political and philosophical writings and his medical training and practice: “In addition to 
being a founder of postcolonial studies, Fanon was also a practicing colonial physician 
who merits contextualization in his own right.”1 This chapter and the one that follows it 
explore a modified version of Keller’s argument, one that sees Fanon’s vocation as a 
psychiatrist and psychoanalyst in North Africa as a decisive factor in his understanding of 
the postcolonial future. Rather than rejecting the knowledge and the skillset he acquires 
in the fundamentally racist university hospital, Fanon critiques and repurposes his 
training in pursuit of the psychological and political liberation of the colonized. Fanon’s 
experience practicing medicine first in France and then North Africa alerts him to the 
ways in which the physician and the knowledge that he produces are always embedded in 
a particular historical and political context. It is from the colony that Fanon critiques the 
way in which the “science” of Antoine Porot’s psychiatry justifies the exercise of 
disciplinary power in North Africa under French rule, an analysis that anticipates Michel 
Foucault’s later interest in the ways in which medicine colludes with the law in the 
maintenance of state power. Fanon diverges from Foucault, however, in granting to the 
activist-physician the power to redefine medicine’s ethical mandate – a line of argument 
that Foucault would no doubt question, since the training of new doctors would entail 
new institutions that, despite their founders’ best intentions, could be appropriated by the 
state as disciplinary mechanisms. Foucault’s attention to the historical conditions of 
                                                
1 Richard C. Keller, “Clinician and Revolutionary: Frantz Fanon, Biography, and the History of 
Colonial Medicine,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 81, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 840–841. 
 20 
knowledge production would lay the groundwork for the development of postcolonial 
studies in the late 1970s by scholars like Edward Said, whose Orientalism (1978) 
reconsidered centuries of intellectual work in light of Europe’s exploration and 
subsequent colonization of the rest of the world. In the 1990s, Homi Bhabha’s The 
Location of Culture (1994) and Ann Laura Stoler’s Race and the Education of Desire: 
Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things (1995) mobilized 
Foucault’s analyses of power, language, and the state in order to critique colonial models 
of society, culture, and politics. In particular, Stoler’s book emphasized the role that 
medical discourse, knowledge, and power played in the “conduct of conduct” in the 
French and Dutch colonies. As a cautious, self-aware graduate of the French medical 
school, Fanon offered a “Foucaultian” analysis of colonial medicine before Foucault, and 
– in his lifelong commitment to providing medical assistance and leadership to the 
colonized – arguably offered a clearer path to political action than either Foucault or the 
postcolonial literary critics and cultural historians that Foucault inspired.       
 
Medicine as Discipline 
The French journal Esprit published Frantz Fanon’s article “The ‘North African 
Syndrome’” in 1952. Fanon had just finished his psychiatric internship at Lyon’s Grange-
Blanche Hospital, where he noticed that French doctors were often unable to treat the 
North African immigrants who came in search of medical assistance. Much to the 
doctor’s dismay, Fanon recounts, the North African patient would complain of various, 
diffuse – even contradictory – pains. This symptomology disrupts the logic of what 
Fanon describes as France’s “exacting medical philosophy” which, in all cases, “proceeds 
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from the symptom to the lesion” (TR 8).2 Since the doctor cannot identify the “lesion” 
causing the inconsistent symptoms that the North African presents, he is forced to make a 
choice: either he must “conclude that medical thinking was at fault” or “find the patient 
at fault” (TR 8).3 Invariably the doctor picks the latter, determining that the North African 
patient is a “man who fancies himself to be ill [malade imaginaire]” (TR 8; PR 18). The 
doctor’s diagnosis preserves the integrity of French medical philosophy only by resorting 
to the “science” of phylogeny: “Every Arab is a man who suffers from an imaginary 
ailment [Tout Arabe est un malade imaginaire]” (TR 9). In other words, North African’s 
symptoms are the consequence of a childlike inability to distinguish the imaginary from 
the real; the North African’s “lesion” is his race’s intellectual underdevelopment. 
In the face of the politics and history that the North African immigrant embodies, 
the doctor asserts his “objectivity” by insisting that all symptoms proceed from organic 
origins. In order to validate this claim, however, he reveals his own imbrication in 
politics and history by judging the colonized North African biologically inferior to the 
colonizing Frenchman. The truth-effects of the doctor’s scientific discourse reinforce the 
racist mythology of colonialism: every “diagnosis of ‘North African syndrome” 
constitutes proof that “the North African is a simulator, a liar, a malingerer, a sluggard, a 
thief” (TR 8, 7).4 However, the confluence of racist mythology and medical practice 
renders the doctor useless to his North African patients. Confident that the North African 
is lying about his pain, the doctor makes a snide remark and sends his patient away 
                                                
2 “[U]ne pensée médicale exigeante … [qui] va du symptôme à la lésion” (PR 17). 
3 “Mais, qu’à l’occasion de ces mêmes symptômes on ne trouve … en tout cas rien de positif, le 
médecin alors verra la pensée médicale en défaut ; et comme toute pensée est pensée de quelque 
chose, il verra le malade en défaut” (PR 18).   
4 “A l’extrême, le Nord-Africain est un simulateur, un menteur, un tire-au-flanc, un fainéant, un 
feignant, un voleur” (PR 17).  
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instead of prescribing medication or performing an operation.  
In order to care for his North African patients, Fanon must renounce the abstract, 
impartial subject position that his colleagues pretend to occupy:  
I am sorry, but I find myself incapable of analyzing this phenomenon without 
departing from the objective attitude to which I have constrained myself. (TR 9)5  
Artificially separating medicine from its historical, geographical, and political contexts 
blinds the doctor to the ways in which he reinforces colonial France’s social and political 
inequalities. In many cases, Fanon argues, it is the “situation” of discrimination, poverty, 
and loneliness that causes the North African immigrant’s physiological and mental 
suffering (TR 10; PR 20). Fanon writes: 
Threatened in his affectivity, threatened in his social activity, threatened in his 
membership in the community – the North African combines all the conditions 
that make a sick man. (TR 13)6  
The doctor begins to treat the “North African Syndrome,” Fanon suggests, at the moment 
when he improves his bedside manner. Keeping in mind the material difficulties the 
North African immigrant encounters every day in a foreign land, the doctor affords his 
patient the dignity and respect he deserves. Ultimately, Fanon’s course of therapy 
culminates outside the clinic, in the betterment of the immigrant’s material standard of 
living:  
                                                
5 “Je m’excuse, je me sens incapable d’analyser ce phénomène sans abonner l’attitude objective que je 
me suis imposée” (PR 19).   
6 “Menacé dans son affectivité, menacé dans son activité sociale, menacé dans son appartenance à la 
cité, le Nord-Africain réunit toutes les conditions qui font un homme malade” (PR 22).  
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There are houses to be built, schools to be opened, roads to be laid out, slums to 
be turn down, cities to be made to spring from the earth, men and women, 
children and children to be adorned with smiles. (TR 15-16)7  
As Françoise Vergès remarks, “Fanon’s argument that medical practitioners must know 
the historical and social conditions of formation of the society in which they exercise, as 
well as its cultural practices and beliefs, radically questioned a medical practice which 
wants to believe in its neutrality.”8  
In his attention to the relationship between scientific and medical knowledge on 
the one hand and the exercise of state power on the other, Fanon anticipates many aspects 
of the work of Michel Foucault. In his “Two Lectures,” delivered in 1976, Foucault 
argues that medical science relies on its presupposed objectivity in order to camouflage 
its complicity with disciplinary power. After emerging as the regulating gaze of the 
school, the hospital, and the barracks, disciplinary power supersedes the overt violence 
and hyper-theatrical exercise of sovereign power. The rhetoric of sovereignty, however, 
re-appears in the State’s legal apparatus, which nominally delegates rights and freedoms 
to each citizen in order to disguise the “closely linked grid of disciplinary coercions 
whose purpose is in fact to assure the cohesion of ... the social body.”9 Inevitably, the 
promises of sovereignty – like rights and freedom – come into conflict with the 
repressions and coercions effected in the name of discipline. Medicine – ostensibly 
                                                
7 “[Il] y a des immeubles à construire, des écoles à ouvrir, des routes à tracer, des taudis à démolir, des 
villes à faire surgir de terre, des homes et des femmes, des enfants et des enfants à garnir des sourires” 
(PR 25).   
8 Françoise Vergès, “To Cure and to Free: The Fanonian Project of ‘Decolonized Psychiatry,’” in 
Fanon: A Critical Reader, ed. Lewis R. Gordon, T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting, and Renée T. White 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 96. 
9 Michel Foucault, “Two Lectures,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 
1972-1977 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 106–107. 
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neutral, objective, impartial, and disinterested – intervenes as a gentler means of 
disciplinary repression and coercion that does not openly contradict sovereignty’s 
mandate of rights and freedoms. Foucault designates the “general medicalization of 
behaviors, conducts, discourses, desires, etc.” as the catalyst of the “society of 
normalization” that defines his own historical moment.10 
In “North African Syndrome,” Fanon suggests that medicine’s role in colonial 
politics is twofold: Medicine ensures, on the one hand, the North African’s orderly 
conduct and, on the other, it offers a fig leaf for the fiction that the North African enjoys 
the same rights and freedoms as the Frenchman. In “Fanon, Foucault, and the Politics of 
Psychiatry,” Chloë Taylor argues that, although France’s colonization of North Africa 
began with “systematic violence,” the cost of lives and manpower ultimately leads France 
to introduce medicine as a “discipline … [of] seduction and assimilation … [that] may be 
harder for the colonized to recognize as power...[that] he or she may be less motivated to 
resist.”11 At the same time, the colonial hospital nominally extends the French citizen’s 
right to healthcare to the colonized. In “North African Syndrome,” Fanon employs his 
trademark sarcasm to reveal France’s universalist discourse of sovereignty as the bearer 
of empty promises for the North African immigrant: 
[The North African] has rights, you will tell me … Rights, Duties, Citizenship, 
Equality! The North African on the threshold of the French Nation – which is, we 
are told, his as well – experiences in the political realm, on the plane of 
citizenship, an imbroglio which no one is willing to face. What connection does 
                                                
10 Ibid., 108. 
11 Chloë Taylor, “Fanon, Foucault, and the Politics of Psychiatry,” in Fanon and The Decolonization 
of Philosophy, ed. Elizabeth A. Hope and Tracey Nicholls (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 
2010), 59. 
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this have with the North African in a hospital setting? It so happens that there is a 
connection. (TR 13)12 
That the North African’s predicament remains “an imbroglio which no one is willing to 
face” is evidence of the ideological supremacy that the rhetoric of sovereignty holds at 
the moment Fanon is writing. But Fanon is not fooled. Although the French State may 
frame the admission of North Africans into colonial hospitals as an egalitarian gesture, 
“North African Syndrome” criticizes the (lack of) treatment they receive from French 
doctors and the deleterious psychological consequences of their institutionalization.  
Fanon would have another opportunity to observe the disciplinary power of 
French medicine when he accepted a position at Algeria’s Blida-Joinville psychiatric 
hospital in 1953. His 1959 essay, “Medicine and Colonialism,” recalls his experiences at 
Blida in order to foreground the doctor’s pernicious role in the colonial juridical process. 
Although the French physician in Algeria may present himself as the “doctor who heals 
the wounds of humanity [le médecin qui panse les plaies de l’humanité]” in this “colony 
which attracts settlers ... the doctor is an integral part of colonization, of domination, of 
exploitation. In Algeria we must not be surprised to find that doctors and professors of 
medicine are leaders of colonialist movements” (DC 133-134; PN 126).13 The most 
obvious reason for the physician's participation in this exploitation is that “the Algerian 
doctor is economically interested in the maintenance of colonial oppression,” since he 
can scam Algerians ignorant of Western medicine into useless but expensive treatments 
                                                
12 “[Le Nord-Africain] a des droits … Droits, Devoirs, Citoyenneté, Egalité, que de belles choses ! Le 
Nord-Africain au seuil de la Nation française – qui est, nous dit-on, la sienne – vit dans le domaine 
politique, sur le plan civique, un imbroglio que personne ne veut voir en face. Quel rapport avec le 
Nord-Africain en milieu hospitalier ? Justement, il y a un rapport” (PR 22). 
13 “[En] Algérie, colonie type de peuplement, … le médecin fait corps avec la colonisation, avec la 
domination, avec l’exploitation. En Algérie, il ne faut donc pas s’étonner que des médecins et des 
professeurs de Faculté soient à la tête des mouvements colonialistes” (RA 126-128).   
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while also collecting profits as the owner of “mills, wine cellars, or orange groves” (DC 
134).14 Yet, for Fanon, economic opportunism alone is not able to explain the “murder of 
certain doctors in Algeria [l’assassinat de certains médecins en Algérie]” (DC 135; RA 
128). That phenomenon is a function of the doctor’s unique position as the translator 
between colonialism’s medical and juridical systems. “Not infrequently,” Fanon reports, 
“the European doctor in Algeria would deliver to the legal authority a certificate of 
natural death for an Algerian who had succumbed to torture or who, more simply, had 
been coldly executed” (DC 137).15 The doctor’s ostensible objectivity serves to disguise 
the politics that in fact led to this loss of life. By locating the medical expert at the 
juncture of scientific and juridical knowledge, Fanon begins a critique of medicine’s role 
at the heart of the criminal justice system that he will return to in The Wretched of the 
Earth and that Michel Foucault would later carry out in the series of lectures 
posthumously collected in the volume titled Abnormal. 
 
The “Science” of Criminality 
Toward the end of 1962’s The Wretched of the Earth, there appears a short essay, 
“From the North African’s Criminal Impulsiveness to the War of National Liberation,” in 
which Fanon excoriates the Algiers School of ethnopsychiatry (WE 219). Founded by 
Antoine Porot in the first half of the 20th century, the Algiers School developed biological 
justifications for Europe’s dehumanizing stereotypes of Africans. In The Wretched, 
Fanon provides lengthy excerpts from Porot’s 1935 and 1939 conference papers, which 
                                                
14 “Le médecin algérien est intéressé, économiquement, au maintien de l’oppression colonial” (RA 
128).    
15 “Il arrive également au médecin européen en Algérie, de délivrer à l’autorité judiciaire un certificat 
de mort naturelle pour un Algérien décédé sous la torture, ou plus simplement, froidement exécuté” 
(RA 130).  
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invoke the rhetoric of neuroscience in order to absolve European colonialists of any 
moral guilt:    
The North African native whose cortex and reflexes are poorly developed … is a 
primitive being whose essentially vegetative and instinctive life is primarily 
governed by his diencephalon. … The cortical functions, if they exist, are 
extremely weak, virtually excluded from the brain’s dynamics. There is therefore 
neither mystery nor paradox. The colonizer’s reluctance to entrust the native with 
any kind of responsibility does not stem from racism or paternalism but quite 
simply from a scientific assessment of the colonized’s limited biological 
possibilities. (WR 225-226)16  
As in “North African Syndrome,” the colonial doctor conspicuously positions himself 
outside of the realm of history and politics. Moreover, Porot attempts to extend 
medicine’s objectivity so far as to erase the possibility of history or politics altogether, 
reducing both to a question of phylogenetic determinism. Fanon, however, tasks himself 
in this essay with revealing the historical, the political, and – especially – the juridical 
functions of Porot’s pretensions to impartiality.     
  The history of “the control of the abnormal individual”17 that Michel Foucault 
elaborates in 1975’s Abnormal illuminates the pivotal role that Porot’s psychiatric 
“science” plays in France’s surveillance and discipline of the Algerian people. In the 
                                                
16 “L’indigène nord-africain, dont les activités supérieures et corticales sont peu évoluées, est un être 
primitif dont la vie essentiellement végétative et instinctive est surtout réglée par son diencéphale. … 
Les fonctions corticales, si elles existent, sont très fragiles, pratiquement non intégrées dans la 
dynamique de l'existence. Il n'y a donc ni mystère ni paradoxe. La réticence du colonisateur à confier 
une responsabilité à l’indigène n’est pas du racisme ou du paternalisme mais tout simplement une 
appréciation scientifique des possibilités biologiquement limitées du colonisé” (DT 221-222). 
17 Michel Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974-1975, trans. Graham Burchell 
(New York: Picador, 2003), 42. 
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beginning of the 19th century, Foucault argues, there arises a fundamentally new penal 
code that doles out punishment in proportion not to the violence of the crime or the 
damage caused by it, but to “the level of interest that underpinned it.”18 The goal of 
punishment is no longer to “expiate” the crime, but rather to “[nullify] … the 
mechanisms of interest at work in the criminal that gave rise to the crime and which 
could give rise to similar crimes in others.”19 In order to punish, therefore, the new penal 
system must be able, first, to prove the criminal’s “reason (raison), which makes him 
punishable” and, second, to understand the criminal’s “motives (raisons) for committing 
the act.”20 The “famous Article 64”21 absolves the penal system of responsibility when 
faced with an irrational criminal; such a criminal is simply deemed “insane” and sent to 
the asylum. But the penal system is “[embarrassed]” when confronted with a rational and 
sane person who commits a “crime without reason,” whose motives and intent cannot be 
logically rationalized.22 In this case, Foucault writes, “[the law] can no longer judge; it is 
obliged to come to a halt and put questions to psychiatry.”23 As Fanon will demonstrate 
in The Wretched of the Earth, the colonial legal system in Algeria turns to the psychiatry 
of the Algiers School in order to explain and make punishable those crimes that juridical 
inquiry cannot.  
 Foucault claims that psychiatry gains its privileged role in the juridical process by 
demonstrating a unique ability to interpret what would otherwise seem like an “irrational” 
                                                
18 Ibid., 114. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., 115. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 122. 
23 Ibid., 117. 
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crime as the product of “a certain morbid dynamic of the instincts.”24 Foucault’s 
argument in Abnormal hinges on the case of Henriette Cornier, a Frenchwoman who cuts 
the throat of a young girl for no apparent reason.25 The court cannot invoke Article 64 in 
order to commit her to an asylum because Cornier demonstrates “perfect lucidity” before 
and after committing the crime:26  
When questioned, she acknowledged that at a certain point she decided that at 
some time she would kill her neighbor’s little daughter. … Second, she had 
arranged her room so as to be able to commit the crime, since she had placed a 
chamber pot on the foot of the bed to catch the blood that would flow from her 
victim’s body. … Finally, according to the indictment, immediately after the 
deed, “she was fully aware of the gravity of what she had done.” The proof of is 
what she said, one of the phrases she uttered after the murder: “This deserves the 
death penalty.”27 
A rational woman who has done an irrational deed, Cornier stumps her judges and jurists. 
It is only when the lawyers suggest during Cornier’s trial that an “instinctive propensity” 
for violence accounts for her criminal act that an explanation begins to emerge.28 “With 
Henriette Cornier,” Foucault argues, “we see the mechanism that transforms an act that 
was a legal, medical, and moral scandal because it lacked a motive into an act that poses 
medicine and law specific questions inasmuch as it arises from a dynamic of instinct.”29 
Henceforth, the medical apparatus and penal system enmesh, effecting a politics of 
                                                
24 Ibid., 131. 
25 Ibid., 112. 
26 Ibid., 124. 
27 Ibid., 125. 
28 Ibid., 130. 
29 Ibid., 131. 
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normalization that seeks to “control,” “correct,” and “rectify” instinct.30 In fact, Foucault 
hews closest to Fanon’s critique of racial prejudice in colonial Algeria’s penal system 
when he describes Nazi Germany’s embrace of eugenics as an attempt at “the correction 
of the human instinctual system by purification of the race.”31  
 In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon argues that Porot’s “discovery” of the North 
African’s “hereditarily violent [héréditairement violent]” disposition enables the colonial 
penal system to incarcerate Algerians on the basis of their “race” (WE 223; DT 219).32 
“Prior to 1954,” Fanon reports, “magistrates, police, lawyers, journalists, and medical 
examiners were unanimous that the Algerian’s criminality posed a problem” (WE 221).33 
The problem was not the simple fact, which Fanon corroborates, that Algerians were 
committing crimes – for the French could build plenty of jails. The problem was that the 
penal system in Algeria could not logically or rationally explain why Algerians were 
robbing and murdering each other: 
Very often the magistrates and police officers are stunned by the motives for the 
murder: a gesture, an allusion, an ambiguous remark, a quarrel over the ownership 
of an olive tree or an animal that has strayed a few feet. The search for the cause, 
which is expected to justify and pin down the murder, in some cases a double or 
triple murder, turns up a hopelessly trivial motive. (WE 222)34  
                                                
30 Ibid., 132. 
31 Ibid., 133. 
32 Although Chapter Three will discuss the psychiatric case studies that Fanon includes in The 
Wretched at length, it is important at this juncture to note that one of Fanon’s patients asks: “Why are 
there only Algerians in prison?” (WE 200). Fanon chooses not to answer during the course of 
treatment, but this essay on the Algiers School provides a rather thorough response to the question.   
33 “Avant 1954, les magistrats, les policiers, les avocats, les journalistes, les médecins légistes 
convenaient de façon unanime que la criminalité de l’Algérien faisait problème” (DT 217). 
34 “Très souvent magistrats et policiers demeurent interdits devant les motifs du meurtre : un geste, 
une allusion, un propos ambigu, une altercation autour d’un olivier possédé en commun, une bête qui 
s’aventure dans un huitième d’hectare... Devant ce meurtre, quelquefois devant ce double ou ce triple 
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As Foucault illustrates, without an understanding of the criminal’s actions and motives, 
the penal system cannot determine or apply punishment. The Algiers School, then, 
collaborates with the penal system by explaining the Algerian’s criminality as a 
consequence of phylogenetic instinct: “We have observed,” writes Porot, “that the 
impulsiveness of the Algerian, the frequency and nature of his murders, his permanent 
criminal tendencies and his primitivism are no coincidences” (WE 226, emphasis 
mine).35 “The Algerian,” Fanon ironizes, “needs to feel the heat of blood and steep 
himself in his victim’s blood. … He finds it impossible to discipline himself” (WE 222-
223).36 Disciplining him, therefore, becomes the colonial penal system’s responsibility. 
The official policy comes from a certain préfet in Algeria: “These instinctive beings … 
who blindly obey the laws of their nature must be strictly and pitilessly regimented” (WE 
228).37 Thanks to Porot, the colonial state possesses sufficient “scientific proof [preuves 
scientifiques]” for the Algerian’s “appalling criminality [criminalité effarante]” to justify 
keeping an entire country under lock and key (WE 221; DT 217). 
 
Medical Reform as Political Action 
Fanon’s critique of the medico-legal system in The Wretched of the Earth 
resembles Foucault’s in Abnormal insofar as both reveal the physician’s ostensible 
objectivity as myth by situating the practice of medicine within a politics of discipline, 
                                                                                                                                            
meurtre, la cause recherchée, le motif dont on attend qu’il justifie et fonde ces meurtres se trouve être 
d’une banalité désespérante” (DT 218). 
35 “Comme on le voit l’impulsivité de l’Algérien, la fréquence et les caractères de ses meurtres, ses 
tendances permanentes à la délinquance, son primitivisme ne sont pas un hasard” (DT 221-222). 
36 “L’Algérien, vous dira-t-on, a besoin de sentir le chaud du sang, de baigner dans le sang de la 
victime. … Il y a chez lui une impossibilité à se discipliner” (DT 218-219).  
37 “Et la conclusion c’est un sous-préfet – aujourd’hui préfet – qui me la donnait : ‘A ces êtres 
naturels,’ disait-il, ‘qui obéissent aveuglément aux lois de leur nature, il faut opposer des cadres stricts 
et implacables. Il faut domestiquer la nature, non la convaincre’” (DT 223).   
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colonial or otherwise. However, Fanon’s last works, written in Algeria and Tunisia in the 
late 1950s, pursue an idea anathema to the conclusions Foucault would draw in the 1970s 
in France: that the doctor-patient relationship could be reformed and reoriented in a non-
coercive, dialogic, and publicly beneficial direction. Fanon’s belief in the therapeutic 
potential of European medicine is all the more surprising given that his first feelings of 
racial inferiority arise as a result of his medical education. In Black Skin, White Masks, 
which he composed (and, in fact, submitted) as his doctoral thesis at the University of 
Lyon, Fanon indicts the French teaching hospital as the producer and popularizer of a 
reductive, racist calculus about the relative value of human lives:   
In the twentieth century the black man on his home territory is oblivious of the 
moment when his inferiority is determined by the Other. … And then we were 
given the occasion to confront the white gaze. (BS 90)38  
Notwithstanding this harsh judgment, Fanon would conclude that medicine could be 
reformed in the interest of the communal good, a conviction that perhaps began to take 
shape during his apprenticeship under the Catalan psychiatrist François (Francesc) 
Tosquelles, who, Alice Cherki notes, “also happened to be an immigrant and an anti-
Franquist.”39 Tosquelles became increasingly alert to the interrelationship of material and 
psychic suffering as a consequence of his status as a cultural minority in the aggressively 
homogenizing and nationalistic context of fascist Spain. Tosquelles chose to leave 
Catalonia, sharing with Fanon the experience of living as an immigrant and medical 
professional in France. During the period of their collaboration, the two psychiatrists 
reconsidered “madness … in light of its close tie to social and/or cultural alienation. The 
                                                
38 “Le Noir chez lui, au XXe siècle, ignore le moment où son infériorité passe par l’autre. … Et puis il 
nous fut donné d’affronter le regard blanc” (PN 89).  
39 Cherki, Frantz Fanon: A Portrait, 20. 
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psychiatric institution itself was itself subject to inquiry and evaluation, and before work 
of any consequence could be undertaken, the institution had to be rid of its own alienation 
and transformed into a space in which the sick and the well could develop appropriate 
models together.”40 In short, Tosquelles inspired Fanon to reform psychiatric medicine 
from the inside.     
In 1953, Fanon accepted a job as an attending physician at Algeria’s Blida-
Joinville mental hospital, with the intention of implementing the methods of institutional 
psychotherapy he had developed with Tosquelles. Until his resignation and subsequent 
exile from Algeria in 1956, Fanon would work in vain to establish a sociotherapy 
program at Blida. According to Alice Cherki41 and Nigel Gibson,42 Fanon ascribed his 
failure to his unfamiliarity with Algerian culture. Since Fanon could not speak Arabic, he 
had to resort to an institutional translator who only “further alienated the doctor/patient 
relationship” that Fanon was trying to humanize.43 But Fanon did not give up on the 
possibility of psychiatric reform. On the contrary, Nigel Gibson argues that “Fanon’s 
appreciation of his failed psychological experiment indicates how quickly he was willing 
to change approaches. His new program included field trips and further studies of 
Algerian history and culture.”44  
In 1957, Fanon was convinced that he should flee an increasingly dangerous 
Algeria for Tunis, where he immediately began working at the Manouba Hospital. But 
rising ethnic and religious tensions at Manouba meant that he and his staff were quickly 
transferred to the Charles-Nicolle Hospital. It was during his tenure at the Charles-
                                                
40 Ibid., 21. 
41 Ibid., 69–70. 
42 Nigel Gibson, Fanon: The Postcolonial Imagination (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2003), 88. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., 88–89. 
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Nicolle that Fanon wrote “Medicine and Colonialism” and the other essays in 1959’s A 
Dying Colonialism, in addition to developing a groundbreaking “day-clinic” model that 
was unlike anything else in either France or the Third World. Like his experiments in 
sociotherapy at Blida, Fanon’s day-clinic was an attempt to move away from the medical 
practice he critiqued in Black Skin and “North African Syndrome.” According to Cherki, 
the day-clinic succeeded where Fanon’s sociotherapy had failed in equalizing the 
relationship between doctor and patient: 
The setup of the Day Clinic allowed for … conflicts to be engaged in an open 
therapy in which they did not become “objectified” and for the doctor/patient 
relationship to unfold in a realm of mutual freedom.45  
Gibson concurs, arguing:  
On the cutting edge of psychiatric hospitalization reform, day hospitalization was 
the form that Fanon pursued to work out a humanistic approach to mental illness, 
to get beyond the Manicheanism of the Algiers School and the jailer/jailed 
relationship of the traditional institution. The point was to bring a “sense of 
normalcy” to a relationship between human beings.46  
Ultimately, however, illness would force Fanon to abandon his reforms. He was 
diagnosed with a fatal form of leukemia in late 1960, barely finishing The Wretched of 
the Earth before his death in 1961.     
 The therapeutic success that Fanon achieved with Tosquelles and in the day-clinic 
at Manouba informs the reformist argument in “Medicine and Colonialism,” namely, that, 
in the right hands, European medicine has the potential to contribute to political progress 
                                                
45 Cherki, Frantz Fanon: A Portrait, 119. 
46 Gibson, Fanon: The Postcolonial Imagination, 91. 
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in the Third World. During the Algerian Revolution, the French authorities established an 
“embargo” banning pharmacists from selling “antibiotics, ether, alcohol, [or] anti-tetanus 
vaccine” to Algerians (DC 139).47 The many fighters wounded in the revolution 
exacerbated what in any case would have been a “dramatic public health problem”; the 
National Liberation Front “found itself faced with the necessity of setting up a system of 
public health capable of replacing the periodic visit of the colonial doctor” (DC 141).48 A 
large share of the responsibility would fall to the likely autobiographical figure Fanon 
calls “the native doctor [le médecin autochtone],” a European-trained physician whose 
allegiance nevertheless lay with the Algerians (DC 142, RA 137).49 Formerly suspected 
of colluding with the French during the colonial period, the native doctor would 
demonstrate his national solidarity by “sleeping on the ground with the men and women 
of the mechtas [couchant sur la terre avec les homes et les femmes de mechtas]” (DC 
142; RA 137). This interaction strips European medicine “of its foreign characteristics 
[ses caractères étrangères],” like racial discrimination and civilizing “paternalism” (DC 
142; RA 137). Fanon’s ambiguous turn of phrase suggests that these traits are foreign to 
not only Algeria but also medicine’s primary, humanitarian mission. Practiced by an 
honest, ethical physician, European medicine proves to be as much of a help to the 
Algerian people as it was a hindrance during the colonial period. Even the most 
ideologically freighted of medical concepts – “hygiene” – could be divorced from the 
                                                
47 “Nous avons signalé que dès les premiers mois de la lute, les autorités françaises décident de mettre 
l’embargo sur les antibiotiques, l’éther, l’alcool, le vaccine antitétanique” (RA 134).  
48 “Le développement de la guerre en Algérie … posent de façon dramatique le problème de la santé 
publique. … [Le Front de Libération nationale] se voit obligé de mettre en place un système sanitaire 
capable de se substituer à la visite périodique du médecin de colonisation” (RA 136).  
49 When Fanon moved to Algeria in 1953, the French-educated, dark-skinned, Antillean doctor who 
knew neither Arabic nor rural poverty quite literally stuck out among his fellow colonial subjects. By 
1959, Fanon’s experiences living with and treating the Algerian people had not only educated him in 
their culture but also earned their utmost respect in his eyes.   
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civilizing mission and recuperated: 
The problems of hygiene and of prevention of disease were approached in a 
remarkably creative atmosphere. The latrines recommended by the colonial 
administration had not been accepted in the mechtas but they were now installed 
in great numbers. Ideas on the transmission of intestinal parasites were 
immediately assimilated by the people. The elimination of stagnant pools was 
undertaken and the fight against post-natal ophthalmia achieved spectacular 
results. (DC 142-143)50 
Unlike Foucault, Fanon argues not only that it is possible to remove the disciplinary 
aspect from the doctor-patient relationship but also that, in doing so, physicians play a 
vital role in liberating the colonized from their psychological and ideological chains.  
In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon would develop a theory and practice of 
political struggle that focused, like his psychiatric reforms, on relationships of power 
between individuals. As Chloë Taylor notes, Fanon’s handbook to decolonization 
provides further evidence of his affinity to yet crucial distance from Foucault: “While 
Foucault raises the political rather than the scientific character of the psychological 
disciplines in order to oppose their practice, Fanon acknowledges but also takes up the 
nonscientific and political function of psychiatry and psychoanalysis, using them as tools 
for anticolonial engagement.”51 Chapter 3 highlights those moments in The Wretched in 
which Fanon’s political recommendations are formulated from the perspective of his 
                                                
50 “Les problèmes de l’hygiène et de la prophylaxie sont abordés dans une atmosphère créatrice 
remarquable. Les latrines que les plans d’Hygiène élaborés par l’administration coloniale s’étaient 
révélés incapables de faire admettre dans les mechtas, se multiplient. Les notions sur la transmission 
des parasitoses intestinales sont immédiatement assimilées par le peuple. La chasse aux eaux stagnant 
est entreprise et la lutte contre les ophtalmies néonatales obtient des résultats spectaculaires” (RA 
137).    
51 Taylor, “Fanon, Foucault, and the Politics of Psychiatry,” 62. 
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medical expertise in order to underscore the connections that Fanon saw between 
psychiatric practice and political praxis during Algeria’s rough transition to national 
independence. Writing as a philosopher, political activist, and physician, Fanon 
understood the diagnosis of the societal symptom not as an end in itself, but as the first 
step toward a cure. 
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The Case Study and The Nation in The Wretched of the Earth 
 
Frantz Fanon dictated The Wretched of the Earth to a team of typists in a race 
against time. In letters, Fanon attributes his haste to the ongoing war in Algeria and the 
sparks of revolution lighting up the rest of the African continent. To François Maspero, 
his publisher, Fanon writes: “I am only compelled to insist [on an earlier publication 
date] because of concrete and important political considerations…. This book is being 
impatiently awaited in Third World political circles.”1 Alice Cherki suggests that Fanon 
tended to downplay the rapid decline of his health, which clearly affected the pace of his 
writing. She recalls how he read the completed manuscript of “On Violence,” the book’s 
first chapter, to her and other friends from his deathbed, shaking from feverish 
convulsions.2 Leukemia would claim his life a few short weeks after The Wretched was 
published in November 1961.3    
Although The Wretched may be Fanon’s last will and testament to the Algerian 
Revolution, it is not, as J. P. Sartre suggests in his influential preface to Fanon’s final 
work, a justification of its violence. On the whole, The Wretched is a cautionary tale, 
littered with warnings to the nascent Algerian government that, in hindsight, are eerily 
prophetic of the military dictatorships, widespread corruption, and bloody tribal conflicts 
that continue to haunt the African continent today. In “Fanon and the Biopolitics of 
Torture,” Lou Turner argues that Fanon develops a “realist attitude to ‘revolutionary 
violence’” by juxtaposing its temporary political necessity with the lasting psychological 
                                                
1 Cherki, Frantz Fanon: A Portrait, 161–162. 
2 Ibid., 161. 
3 Ibid., 164. 
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and emotional traumas it inflicted on “a whole generation of Algerians.”4 Turner’s 
reading puts an unprecedented emphasis on The Wretched’s fifth chapter, “Colonial War 
and Mental Disorders,” which is comprised of a discontinuous series of psychiatric case 
studies whose “dismissal has been so unanimous,” writes Alice Cherki, “that it has been 
treated as incidental and its discussion relegated to the footnotes.”5 Fanon himself 
suspected that few would understand his decision to include medical observations in a 
book about politics: “Perhaps the reader will find these notes on psychiatry out of place 
or untimely in a book like this,” he writes (WE 181).6 Once again repudiating the 
doctrine of epistemological apartheid that he learned to despise in medical school,7 Fanon 
marshals the diagnostic procedures and rhetorical methods of psychiatry in order to make 
observations about military, juridical, and historical matters. The case studies in 
“Colonial War and Mental Disorders” perform a simultaneous critique of dominant 
medical practices and of revolutionary narratives. Departing from what Turner calls the 
“now hegemonic view that Fanon was an ‘apostle of violence’” requires an 
interdisciplinary perspective that decades of Fanon scholars were paradoxically unwilling 
or unable to adopt.8  
By publishing these case studies as a part of his final work, Fanon demonstrates 
not only his Hippocratic commitment to those minds that were sometimes irreparably 
damaged by the violence of decolonization but also his belief that this psychiatric 
                                                
4 Turner, “Fanon and the Biopolitics of Torture: Contextualizing Psychological Practices as Tools of 
War,” 124. 
5 Cherki, Frantz Fanon: A Portrait, 178. 
6 “On trouvera peut-être inopportunes et singulièrement déplacées dans un tel livre ces notes de 
psychiatrie” (DT 177).  
7 Chapters One and Two argue that Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks and “The ‘North African 
Syndrome’” deny the French medical establishment’s assertion that politics and history play no role in 
the genesis or treatment of disease.    
8 Turner, “Fanon and the Biopolitics of Torture: Contextualizing Psychological Practices as Tools of 
War,” 124. 
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testimony makes an important contribution to the groundbreaking reading of the process 
of decolonization that is The Wretched of the Earth. Fanon’s tangible concern for the 
health and wellbeing of the Algerian people prolongs the timeline of revolution into his 
present, interrupting “Manichean” historical narratives that hastily declare independence 
on the part of a nation that has not yet established equitable systems of governance and 
economy: “But the war goes on,” Fanon warns, “and for many years to come we shall be 
bandaging the countless and sometimes indelible wounds inflicted on our people by the 
colonialist onslaught” (WE 181).9 As if to quiet premature cheers and applause, these 
opening lines to “Colonial War and Mental Disorders” recall the argument that Fanon 
makes in so many contexts in The Wretched that the transition from colonial territory to 
independent nation does not end with the expulsion of the colonial power. In earlier 
chapters, Fanon criticizes those who “imagined [they] could switch straight from 
colonized subject to sovereign citizen of an independent nation,”10 insisting that “in 
actual fact everything has to be started over from scratch”11 (WE 88, 56). The Wretched 
evinces the extensive theoretical evaluations and material changes that both the hospital 
and state must undergo in order to be fully rid of colonialism’s dehumanizing logics. The 
unconventional casebook at the end of The Wretched lays out a roadmap for revolution 
both in psychiatry and in politics.   
 
                                                
9 “Mais la guerre continue. Et nous aurons à panser des années encore les plaies multiples et 
quelquefois indélébiles faites à nos peuples par le déferlement colonialiste” (DT 177). 
10 “Tant qu’il s’imaginait pouvoir passer sans transition de l’état de colonisé à l’état de citoyen 
souverain d’une nation indépendante, tant qu’il se prenait au mirage de l’immédiateté́ de ses muscles 
le colonisé ne réalisait pas de véritables progrès dans la voie de la connaissance” (DT 87).  
11 “Le pays se retrouve entre les mains de la nouvelle équipe mais en réalité il faut tout reprendre, tout 
repenser” (DT 57, emphasis mine).  
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A New Kind of Case Study 
 In “Colonial War and Mental Disorders,” Fanon modifies the formal and 
rhetorical structures of the case study in order to challenge dominant ideas in 
psychoanalysis and other psychiatric schools of thought. Whereas in Black Skin, White 
Masks Fanon reconsiders Freudian psychoanalytic theory from the perspective of the 
colonized, in The Wretched of the Earth Fanon alters Freudian psychoanalytic practice to 
suit the needs of the postcolonial nation. Fanon relinquishes the interpretive authority that 
the Freudian case study accords to the analyst in order to treat his patients as dialogic 
interlocutors in their own therapy and recovery. Fanon’s case studies also repudiate the 
methodological assumptions that he was taught in medical school by giving voice to 
those patients who suffered from psychopathological responses to the violence of the 
Algerian Revolution. By juxtaposing never-before-heard psychiatric testimony with the 
political recommendations that comprise the first 200 pages of The Wretched, Fanon 
highlights Algeria’s public health as a key challenge that the newfound nation will have 
to address in the postcolonial era. 
In one of his most famous case studies, Freud approaches the child he calls “Little 
Hans” not as a thoughtful human being capable of providing insights into psychological, 
cultural, and political phenomena, but rather as empirical evidence for various 
psychoanalytic hypotheses: “The physician who treats an adult suffering from neurosis 
by means of psychoanalysis … eventually arrives at certain assumptions about infantile 
sexuality. … But the psychoanalyst may admit to the desire for more direct, more 
immediate proof of these fundamental principles.”12 This proof is “Little Hans,” a five-
                                                
12 Sigmund Freud, “Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy [’Little Hans’],” in The “Wolfman” 
and Other Cases (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 3–4. 
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year-old boy, whose father – a disciple of Freud’s – is subjecting him to analysis at home. 
Whenever Hans’ father is perplexed by his son’s symptoms, the two go to visit Freud in 
search of an interpretation that conforms to psychoanalytic theory. The inadequacy of the 
apprentice psychoanalyst reinforces the virtual omniscience of the master. During one 
session, for example, Freud comments on the resemblance between the face of a horse 
(Little Hans is terrified of horses) and Little Hans’s bearded and bespectacled father: 
“Such details as I now learnt, things that particularly bothered him – what the horses had 
over their eyes and the black around their mouths – ... [lead to] a further intimation of 
what the solution could be, and [I] understood very well why it might elude Hans’s father 
in particular.”13 Based on his schema of infantile sexuality, Freud concludes that Little 
Hans transfers his libidinal “hostility” towards his father onto the horse.14 In Freud’s 
narrative, it is Little Hans himself who pronounces the uncanny accuracy of 
psychoanalytic interpretation: “Does the Professor talk to the good Lord, since he knows 
everything before he is told?” Hans asks his father.15  
 In Fanon’s case studies, many of his patients’ words and actions are made to stand 
on their own, without interpretation. Fanon intimates in Black Skin, White Masks that he 
does not believe in the therapeutic power of leading the patient to the conclusion arrived 
at by the analyst; instead, Fanon seeks to enable his patient to “choose action (or 
passivity) with respect to the real source of the conflict, i.e., the social structure” (BS 
80).16 In the case studies of “Colonial War and Mental Disorders,” Fanon demonstrates 
                                                
13 Ibid., 32. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 “[M]on but, au contraire, sera, une fois les mobiles éclairés, de le mettre en mesure de choisir 
l’action (ou la passivité) à l’égard de la véritable source conflictuelle — c'est-à-dire à l’égard des 
structures sociales” (PN 81).  
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his continued belief that formal psychoanalysis should play a limited role in treatment. 
For example, in the case of an Algerian man who barely survived a French massacre, the 
patient’s “disinclination to communicate and a tendency to keep to himself [une 
réticence, une certaine tendance à la solitude]” lead Fanon to “[fear] the worst [craindre 
une évolution plus grave]”; however, instead of pursuing psychoanalytic therapy, Fanon 
discharges the patient from the mental hospital into “the care of the FLN’s social services 
[au service social du F.L.N.]” (WE 191-192; DT 187).17 Removing the patient from the 
context of the mental hospital constitutes a treatment decision that is justified when the 
patient returns after six months of employment and is “doing well [va bien]” (WE 192; 
DT 187).18 In another case, in which an Algerian man has nightmares of disemboweled 
women after having killed a French woman with a knife, Fanon concludes that he can 
offer no therapeutic solution: “As unscientific as it may seem, we believe only time may 
heal the dislocated personality of this young man” (WE 194).19  
In another case, extended conversations with his patient lead Fanon to renounce a 
classic Freudian diagnosis and treatment plan in favor of sociotherapy (WE 187). The 
patient in question is a FLN fighter who experiences impotence after learning that French 
soldiers have imprisoned and raped his wife. He tells Fanon that he has since tried and 
failed to have sex with other women; in one instance, “before the act he had an 
irresistible impulse to tear up a photo of his little girl [quelques instants avant l’acte, 
                                                
17 The FLN (Front de Libération Nationale) waged the war for independence in Algeria.  
18 This interpretation of the case of the massacre survivor is reinforced by Fanon’s implementation of 
sociotherapy and the day-clinic model that was discussed in Chapter Two. By relaxing, in the case of 
sociotherapy, or truncating, in the case of the day-clinic, the rigid social structure of the psychiatric 
institution, Fanon ventures to equalize the relationship between the doctor and the patient. The case of 
the massacre survivor likewise highlights the role that the patient’s re-introduction into social life 
plays in the process of psychiatric healing and recovery, all the while downplaying the importance of 
the doctor’s interventions.  
19 “Aussi peu scientifique que cela puisse sembler, nous pensons que seul le temps pourra apporter 
quelque amélioration dans la personnalité disloquée du jeune homme” (DT 189).  
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envie irrésistible de déchirer une photo de sa petite fille]” (WE 187; DT 183). This leads 
Fanon to consider whether “unconscious incestuous drives [pulsions incestueuses 
inconscientes]” are at work (WE 187; DT 183). However, Fanon determines that the 
photograph of the patient’s daughter simply leads the patient to think the about rest of his 
family, including his wife. Moreover, the case study suggests that the patient does not 
primarily feel jealous that other men had sex with his wife but rather guilty that his 
political engagements led to the abuse of someone he cared about. We learn that the 
patient married out of obligation and custom rather than love, and that before the war, the 
married couple barely spoke to one another. Upon hearing of the rape, and understanding 
its primarily political motivation, the patient’s indifference turns to respect; he describes 
his wife to Fanon as a “tenacious woman who was prepared to accept anything rather 
than give up her husband. … That woman had saved my life and had protected the 
network” (WE 188).20 He realizes her value in relation to the revolution, and, discarding 
the sexist traditions that would mark a raped woman as dishonored, decides to take her 
back after independence. By presenting his patient’s “confidences” as a monologue, 
uninterrupted by the voice of the physician, Fanon emphasizes the degree to which the 
patient’s gradual recovery is the result not of Fanon’s psychoanalytic judgments but 
rather an individual and communal process of reflection and healing: Fanon marks the 
beginning of the patient’s recovery as the day when he “accepted to listen to political 
discussions” among his peers (DT 185, WE 189).  
                                                
20 “Ce n’était donc pas un simple viol, par désœuvrement ou par sadisme comme j’ai eu l’occasion 
d’en voir dans les douars, c’était le viol d’une femme têtue, qui acceptait tout au lieu de vendre son 
mari. Et ce mari, c’était moi. Cette femme m’avait sauvé la vie, et avait protégé le réseau” (DT 184).  
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Alice Cherki argues that the innovative psychoanalytic and psychiatric practice 
documented in Fanon’s case studies represents one of the first attempts to diagnose and 
treat what today we know as post-traumatic stress disorders.21 In his critique of Octave 
Mannoni’s psychoanalytic interpretation of the French colonization of Madagascar in 
Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon argues that the trauma responsible for the Malagasy’s 
alienation and neurosis was not inflicted during childhood, but rather during a much more 
recent past marked by widespread discrimination and violence. Fanon supports his 
argument by re-interpreting seven of Mannoni’s case studies in light of the military 
conflict in Madagascar, eschewing the archetypal analysis that Mannoni had learned from 
Freud. Pointing out the historical fact that the French forced Senegalese conscripts to 
torture and kill rebellious Malagasies, Fanon argues that the “fierce black bull” in the 
cook’s dream does not represent an abstract “phallus” and that the two black men in the 
thirteen-year-old’s dream do not stand for “two fathers—one representing the actual 
father, the other the ancestor,” but that in fact these black figures are a terrorized 
unconscious’ manifestations of “the Senegalese in the criminal investigation department” 
(BS 86, 85).22 Another adolescent dreams that black soldiers are chasing him with guns; 
Fanon insists that “the Senegalese soldier’s rifle is not a penis, but a genuine Lebel 1916 
model” (BS 86).23 In these cases Fanon highlights psychoanalysis’ propensity to produce 
abstruse and misleading interpretations when, in many cases, the truth is on the surface of 
the patient’s testimony. In The Wretched, Fanon seeks to reform another method of 
                                                
21 Cherki, Frantz Fanon: A Portrait, 179. 
22 “Le taureau noir furieux, ce n’est pas le phallus. Les deux hommes noirs, ce ne sont pas les deux 
pères — l’un représentant le père réel, l’autre l’ancêtre”; “le taureau noir, les hommes noirs, ce ne sont 
ni plus ni moins que les Sénégalais du bureau de la Sûreté” (PN 86, 85).  
23 “Le fusil du tirailleur sénégalais n’est pas un pénis, mais véritablement un fusil Lebel 1916” (PN 
86). 
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psychiatric knowledge production by suggesting a causal relationship between the brutal 
violence of the Algerian Revolution and the shocking prevalence of psychopathology in 
post-revolutionary Algeria (WE 183). Fanon’s case studies invert the clinical psychiatric 
doctrine that “privileges the event that triggered the disorder, perhaps mentioning – here 
and there – the role played by the psychological, affective and biological history of the 
patient and by his milieu” (WE 183, translation modified).24 In decolonized Algeria, 
Fanon argues, “the triggering factor is principally the bloody, pitiless atmosphere, the 
generalization of inhuman practices, of people’s lasting impression that they are 
witnessing a veritable apocalypse” (WE 183, emphasis mine).25 What follows is the novel 
suggestion that even if the patient wasn’t directly involved in combat, he or she may still 
suffer from a psychotic reaction to the diffuse and violent trauma of everyday life under 
decolonization.26 
Fanon argues that the “well-established notion” in the French psychiatric 
community that the psychotic disorders triggered by the violence of decolonial war are 
“relatively benign” is the beginning of a public mental health crisis (WE 184).27 Fanon 
insists that his psychiatric contemporaries underestimate both the virulence and 
prevalence of what today we would recognize as post-traumatic stress disorders. For 
                                                
24 “[O]n privilégie l’évènement qui a déclenché la maladie quoique. Ca et là, soit mentionné le rôle du 
terrain (l’histoire psychologique, affective et biologique du sujet) et celui du milieu” (DT 179).  
25 “Il nous semble que dans les cas présentés ici, l’événement déclenchant est principalement 
l’atmosphère sanglante, impitoyable, la généralisation de pratiques inhumaines, l’impression tenace 
qu’ont les gens d’assister à une véritable apocalypse” (DT 179). 
26 This type of case is exemplified by the young Frenchwoman who suffers from anxiety after her 
father’s death. Her father made a career out of torturing Algerians in the basement of the family home 
and is recognized after his death as an upstanding and patriotic Frenchman. The daughter says she 
heard the screams. She refuses a pension from the government on her own volition, but turns to Fanon 
to dry her sweaty palms. Characteristically, he never tells us his treatment plan or if he sees any 
improvement in the patient. 
27 “Une autre notion fortement établie mérite à nos yeux un léger assouplissement : il s’agit de la 
relative bénignité de ces troubles réactionnels” (DT 180).  
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Fanon, the case studies illustrate that “these disorders last for months, wage a massive 
attack on the ego, and almost invariably leave behind a vulnerability virtually visible to 
the naked eye. In all evidence the future of these patients is compromised” (WE 184).28 
The patients that Fanon refers to are not just the dozen or so whose case histories are 
compiled in “Colonial War and Mental Disorders”; Fanon’s case studies evince a pattern 
of contagion that suggests a dangerous mental health epidemic. Fanon argues that the 
scope and violence of decolonial warfare in Algeria is unprecedented. He compares the 
Algerian Revolution to the two World Wars, only to conclude that “the novel 
physiognomy of some of the case histories mentioned here provides confirmation, if we 
still need it, that this colonial war is a new phenomenon even in the pathology it 
produces” (WE 184).29 Fanon suggests that the Algerian Revolution affected Algerian 
society in a more totalizing way than the two World Wars impacted Europe: at times, 
Fanon argues, the conflict in Algeria “takes on the aspect of a genuine genocide [prend 
l’allure d’un authentique génocide] … which radically disrupts and shatters the world 
[qui bouleverse et casse le monde]” (WE 183). Although Richard Philcox translates 
Fanon’s choice to “[accorder] ici une singulière priorité à la guerre prise dans sa totalité 
et dans ses particularités” as “[putting] particular emphasis on war in general and the 
specific circumstances of a colonial war,” in light of Fanon’s earlier references to 
“apocalypse” and “genocide” it is more likely that Fanon here is arguing that the unique 
quality of colonial war is its totality. There is no escaping it, whether you are a soldier, 
                                                
28 “Ce sont des troubles qui persistent des mois durant, attaquant massivement le moi, et laissant 
presque toujours comme séquelle une fragilité pratiquement discernable à vue d’œil. De toute 
évidence, l’avenir de ces malades est hypothéqué” (DT 180).  
29 “La physionomie inédite de certains tableaux psychiatriques signalés ici confirme, s’il en est encore 
besoin, que cette guerre coloniale est originale même dans la pathologie qu’elle sécrète” (DT 179-
180). 
 48 
policeman, intellectual, mother, or child. By including these case studies in The Wretched 
of the Earth, Fanon argues that any genuine narrative of “national consciousness [la 
conscience nationale]” must include the voices of the mentally ill (WE 179; DT 174). For 
Fanon, one of the primary challenges facing the burgeoning Algerian nation would be to 
care for its many citizens suffering from the psychopathologies of anticolonial war.  
 
A New Kind of Nation 
 The case studies play an essential part in Fanon’s critique of the triumphalist 
narratives of bourgeois and militant nationalism that he feared would dictate the politics 
of post-colonial Algeria. Fanon understands both bourgeois and militant nationalism as 
reproductions of the morals and culture that were imposed under colonial rule. Both 
narratives of national progress produce a “Hegelian” or what Fanon calls “Manichean” 
opposition between a privileged group and a disinherited one. For Fanon, the nationalist 
bourgeoisie enriches itself at the expense of the working class and peasants, preferring to 
spend its wealth on conspicuous consumption rather than investments in national 
infrastructure. The militant nationalism of groups like the FLN, Fanon argues, causes a 
fissure between the party’s intellectual leaders and the masses. On the one hand, Fanon 
sees the beginnings of “a bourgeois dictatorship [une dictature bourgeoise]”; on the 
other, “a dictatorship of civil servants [une dictature de fonctionnaires]” (WE 111, 123; 
DT 108, 120). Furthermore, both the bourgeoisie and the party inherit the European 
colonizers’ tendency to demarcate social and political groups according to race. First, 
Fanon resumes his earlier critique of Freud’s “narcissism of minor differences” in The 
Wretched by exposing the racism implicit in bourgeois nationalism. The respective 
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bourgeoisies of North and Sub-Saharan Africa discriminate against one another: the 
North Africans describe Sub-Saharan Africa as “wild, savage, uncivilized, and lifeless”; 
the Sub-Saharans make “hateful remarks about veiled women, polygamy, and the Arabs’ 
alleged contempt for the female sex” (WE 108).30 Whereas Freud would likely describe 
this feud as harmless, Fanon understands it as “the [foundation] for a racist philosophy 
that is terribly prejudicial to the future of Africa. Through its apathy and mimicry it 
encourages the growth and development of racism that was typical of the colonial period” 
(WE 108).31 Second, Fanon exposes the frequency with which a “dictatorship of civil 
servants” is also “a genuine ethnic dictatorship [une authentique dictature ethnique]” 
(WE 126; DT 122). However, Fanon argues that the tribal unity of the “so-called national 
party” is often short-lived: 
The ministers, private secretaries, ambassadors, and prefects are chosen from the 
leader’s ethnic group, sometimes even directly from his family. … This 
tribalization of power results, much as one would expect, in regionalist thinking 
and separatism. Decentralizing trends surface and triumph, the nation 
disintegrates and is dismembered. (WE 126)32 
                                                
30 “On regarde l’Afrique Noire comme une région inerte, brutale, non civilisée... sauvage. Là, on 
entend à longueur de journée des réflexions odieuses sur le voile des femmes, sur la polygamie, sur le 
mépris supposé des Arabes pour le sexe féminin” (DT 105).  
31 “Toutes ces réflexions rappellent par leur agressivité celles que l’on a si souvent décrites chez le 
colon. La bourgeoisie nationale de chacune de ces deux grandes régions, qui a assimilé jusqu’aux 
racines les plus pourries de la pensée colonialiste, prend le relais des Européens et installe sur le 
continent une philosophie raciste terriblement préjudiciable pour l'avenir de l’Afrique. Par sa paresse 
et son mimétisme elle favorise l’implantation et le renforcement du racisme qui caractérisait l'ère 
colonial” (DT 105-106).  
32 “Les ministres, les chefs de cabinets, les ambassadeurs, les préfets sont choisis dans l’ethnie du 
leader, quelquefois même directement dans sa famille. … Cette tribalisation du pouvoir entraine on 
s’en doute l’esprit régionaliste, le séparatisme. Les tendances décentralisatrices surgissent et 
triomphent, la nation se disloque, se démembre” (DT 122). 
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Fanon’s case studies show the prevalence and consequences of “Hegelian,” Manichean, 
and fundamentally racist narratives of national consciousness in Algeria. In the case 
studies, Fanon underscores the violent and destructive consequences of nationalist 
ideologies that pit one cultural or ethnic group against the other.   
 The juxtaposition of two of Fanon’s most haunting case studies illuminates the 
similarity that Fanon saw between European narratives of racist nationalism and 
revolutionary Algeria’s triumphant narratives of national independence. In the first case, 
Fanon is required to treat a French torturer suffering from nightmares and from lack of 
appetite. The patient smokes three packs of cigarettes a day and beats his wife and 
children. In addition to brutalizing his family, the patient threatens those ahead of him in 
the line for a newspaper with violence. It is clear that he can no longer distinguish 
between his home-life and work-life; everything is a contest of physical force. The 
patient’s extended testimony reveals that what has turned this père de famille into a 
“radical and absolute [sadist]” is France’s “coherent system” of racist national ideology 
(WE 199).33 Despite his psychiatric symptoms and family troubles, the torturer sees his 
role in the French war effort as too crucial to allow him to resign: 
The fact is … we’re now doing the infantrymen’s work. Last week, for example, 
they treated us as if we were in the army. Those guys in the government say 
there’s no war in Algeria and the police force must restore law and order. But 
there is a war in Algeria, and when they realize it, it’ll be too late. (WE 197, 
translation modified)34  
                                                
33 “On se trouve en présence avec cette observation d’un système cohérent qui ne laisse rien intact. … 
[I]l y a bel et bien une existence qui s’inscrit sur le registre d’un sadisme radical et absolu” (DT 194). 
34 “C’est que … nous faisons maintenant un travail d’infanterie. La semaine dernière par exemple, 
nous étions en opération comme si nous appartenions à l’armée. Ces messieurs du gouvernement 
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The patient’s testimony also reveals that it is a particular conflation of French masculinity 
and racial and ethnic identity that makes systematically inflicting pain on other human 
beings possible in the first place. The torturer is motivated by an ostensibly patriotic 
“competition [compétition]” that measures “personal success [succès personnel]” 
according to the amount of information he can produce for the French state (WE 198). 
Fanon’s patient reveals that, at the police station, he is “careful” not to let “the other guy 
take all the glory” (WE 198).35 Fanon’s patient describes torture as a kind of skillful art 
that requires “flair”: “You need to know when to tighten your grip and when to loosen it. 
… When the guy is ripe [mûr], there’s no point continuing to hit him” (WE 198, DT 
193).36 The torturer’s agricultural language underscores the racial dehumanization at 
work in the torture chamber. He recalls that the Senegalese torturers that the 
commissariat employed at one point lacked the “[intelligence] needed to succeed in this 
kind of work” (WE 198, translation modified).37 It would follow that the Algerians being 
tortured lack the “intelligence” or mental capacity to deserve a fair trial or human 
compassion.   
 The second case study indicts Algerian ethnic nationalism as a cause of senseless 
and needless violence. Of all the cases, this one is least marked by Fanon’s 
interpretations: large portions are printed as a dramatic dialogue between Fanon and his 
two patients. The primary figures in this case study are two Algerian boys who admit to 
                                                                                                                                            
disent qu’il n’y a pas de guerre en Algérie, et quand ils s’en rendront compte, ce sera trop tard” (DT 
193).  
35 “Il est vrai qu’on se relaie, mais c’est une question que de savoir à quel moment passer la main au 
copain. Chacun … se garde bien de céder l’oiseau préparé à l’autre, qui naturellement, en tirera une 
gloire” (DT 193).  
36 “C’est une question de flair. Quand le gars est mûr, ce n’est pas la peine de continuer à taper” (DT 
193). 
37 “En fait, il faut être intelligent pour réussir dans ce travail” (DT 193). 
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having killed one of their European playmates.38 Just as the French torturer saw his job as 
a crucial component of France’s war against Algeria, the two Algerian boys understand 
their crime as the best contribution they can make to the revolution. The younger boy 
seems to fear that the French will kill him (and all the other “Arabs”), unless the “Arabs” 
kill the French first. Estimating a low chance of successfully killing a French adult, the 
boy chooses a French child as an equivalent target:  
One day we decided to kill him because the Europeans want to kill all the Arabs. 
We can’t kill the “grown-ups,” but we can kill someone like him because he’s our 
own age. (WE 199)39 
Further testimony suggests that the boy fears that his victim would eventually grow into a 
copy of his racist father, who is in the French militia and who believes that Arabs “ought 
to have [their] throats slit [il faut (les) égorger]” (WE 200; DT 195). Implying that the 
murder was an act of retributive justice, the older boy’s testimony fully exposes the way 
in which the logic of ethnic nationalism creates a false equivalence of human lives and 
actions. He explains to Fanon that two of his family members were killed during the 
Rivet Massacre in 1956, when, as Fanon explains in a footnote, “French militia dragged 
forty men from their beds and murdered them” (WE 201).40 First, the older boy expresses 
his disappointment in the colonial legal system, which would hold no one responsible for 
the massacre. Then he tells Fanon that he wanted to avenge his family by fighting for the 
                                                
38 That the three boys used to play together – in fact, the younger Algerian boy says the European was 
“our best friend” – illuminates the mechanics of Manichean nationalist ideology (WE 199). Until the 
children are made to realize their racial heritage and national allegiance, they treat each other 
indiscriminately.    
39 “Un jour on a décidé de le tuer, parce que les Européens ils veulent tuer tous les Arabes. Nous, on 
ne peut pas tuer ‘les grands.’ Mais comme lui, il a notre âge, on peut” (DT 195).  
40 “Rivet est un village qui, depuis certain jour de l’année 1956, est devenu célèbre dans la région de 
l’Algérois. Un soir en effet, le village fut envahi par des miliciens français qui, après avoir arraché de 
leurs lits quarante hommes les assassinèrent” (DT 196). 
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revolution, only to be turned away for his age. Finally, it seems, he decides to make 
justice by killing a close friend, one who happened to be born to a racist militiaman.41 
Following a racist logic of phylogenetic inheritance, the boys satisfy their fear and hatred 
of the French militia by killing a French adolescent who in fact had nothing to do 
inflicting pain and terror on the Algerian people.  
 In his 1994 essay, “DissemiNation: Time, narrative and the margins of the 
modern nation,” Homi Bhabha shapes Fanon’s concerns about ethnic nationalism into a 
theory of the post-colonial nation as locus of plurality and difference. Bhabha identifies 
“On National Culture,” the fourth chapter of The Wretched of the Earth, as one of the 
first attempts to conceptualize the nation as “a dialectic of various temporalities – 
modern, colonial, postcolonial, ‘native’ – that cannot be stabilized in its enunciation.”42 
By refusing to accord political primacy to ethnic North Africans, Muslims, or European 
and European-trained intellectuals, Fanon produces what Bhabha describes as a 
“[counter-narrative] of the nation that continually [evokes] and [erases] its totalizing 
boundaries – both actual and conceptual – [that] disturb those ideological manoeuvres 
through which ‘imagined communities’ are given essentialist identities.”43 In The 
Wretched of the Earth, writes Bhabha: 
We are confronted with the nation split within itself, articulating the heterogeneity 
of the population. The barred nation It/Self, alienated from its eternal self-
generation, becomes a liminal signifying space that is internally marked by the 
                                                
41 By foregrounding the historical and political context of the boys’ crime, Fanon provides an 
alternative explanation for Algerian criminality than the racist psychiatry of the Algiers School that, as 
detailed in Chapter Two, reinforced the legal and disciplinary apparatus of French colonialism.  
42 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994), 152. 
43 Ibid., 149. 
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discourses of minorities, the heterogeneous histories of contending peoples, 
antagonistic authorities and tense locations of cultural difference.44  
In short, Bhabha suggests that Fanon was among the first thinkers to conceptualize the 
postcolonial nation as an inherently multicultural and variegated polity. 
 By transforming the monologic Freudian case study into a dialogic testimony of 
historical experience, Fanon gives voice to a diverse cross-section of the Algerian (and 
French) population exposed in one way or another to the physical and structural violence 
of anticolonial war. Informed by his own psychiatric practice, Fanon understands 
dominant notions of French and Algerian nationalism as a fundamental cause of this 
brutal violence and, therefore, the mental illnesses endemic to the war and its aftermath. 
The personal narratives collected in “Colonial War and Mental Disorders” serve not only 
to demonstrate to psychiatrists the clinical importance of the patient’s historical and 
cultural context but also to prove to politicians and intellectuals that “Hegelian” or 
“Manichean” models of history and revolution only perpetuate conflict and psychosis. 
Fanon’s practice of psychiatry allows him to imagine a new schema of social relations 
that today forms the basis of the postcolonial perspective.     
                                                
44 Ibid., 148. 
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Conclusion 
 
In “Clinician and Revolutionary: Frantz Fanon, Biography, and the History of 
Colonial Medicine,” Richard C. Keller wonders aloud: “Who is to say what might have 
become of Fanon in the atmosphere of the 1960s?”1 The question points to the ways in 
which the forces of decolonization fundamentally altered the structure and practices of 
the research university, another institution like the medical hospital, whose ostensible 
objectivity had rarely been challenged. Beginning in the 1960s, public intellectuals like 
Michel Foucault started to investigate – from the inside – the cultural, historical, and 
political implications of certain forms of knowledge production. Although Fanon was 
never a university professor, it is likely that his study of material culture and medical 
practice would only have been emboldened by the explicit politicization of academic 
work. 
Alice Cherki imagines that if Fanon had not died in 1961, he almost certainly 
would have continued to practice psychiatry and to write about his experiences and 
beliefs.2 Biographical evidence suggests that many of Fanon’s friends believed in the 
possibility of a last-minute cure, one so much so that he paid for Fanon’s round-trip 
airfare to pursue treatment at the American National Institute of Health (NIH) in 
Bethesda, Maryland.3 For Fanon – whose remarks in Black Skin, White Masks about the 
representation of blacks in American folk tales were far from positive – putting his life in 
American hands was a difficult choice to make (BS 108, 151-154). If the oncologists had 
                                                
1 Keller, “Clinician and Revolutionary: Frantz Fanon, Biography, and the History of Colonial 
Medicine,” 837. 
2 Cherki, Frantz Fanon: A Portrait, 202. 
3 Ibid., 164.  
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– miraculously – been able to save Fanon’s life, it is likely that Fanon’s account of his 
time in an American hospital would have been nothing less than enthralling.  
It is fascinating to consider what Fanon would have thought about the 
organization that sprung out of the May 1968 revolts in Paris called Doctors Without 
Borders [Médecins Sans Frontières], which, like Fanon, seems to understand a particular 
form of practicing medicine and providing for the public health as a valuable means of 
ensuring peace and political stability in what Fanon would have known as the Third 
World. Would Fanon’s faith in the political power of the activist-physician have 
withstood Foucault’s anti-humanist critiques of medicine’s inevitable interpellation into 
the disciplinary politics of normalization? Would Fanon have found an ally or an enemy 
in anti-psychiatrists like Félix Guattari? These questions are purely speculative, of 
course, but they highlight the degree to which the problems Fanon identified during his 
brief career still haunt our present.  
Despite the recent development of the Medical Humanities in the American 
university, the medical sciences still enjoy an unmatched degree of discursive authority 
and putative objectivity in the United States. Biopolitical concerns like abortion rights 
and physician-assisted suicide have brought the relationship between medicine and 
politics to the attention of many American scholars and journalists, but, in general, the 
doctor’s imbrication in history and politics remains obscured by his or her scientific 
jargon and the perceived timelessness of institutions like the clinic and the hospital. I 
hope this thesis inspires future scholars to turn to the work not only of Michel Foucault 
but also of Frantz Fanon in their efforts to reveal the political and cultural ramifications 
of medical practice. Like any of us, Fanon was a product of his times, but his 
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unprecedented and perhaps unsurpassed analysis of medicine’s interrelationship with 
culture and politics provides key insights into some of today’s most important questions. 
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